

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*A Radio Broadcast*

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

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## THE CONGRESS

# Report on First Session Of the Council of Foreign Ministers

*Address by THE SECRETARY OF STATE* <sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press October 5]

The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers closed in a stalemate. But that need not, and should not, deprive us of a second and better chance to get on with the peace.

In the past I have been both criticized and commended for being a compromiser. I confess that I do believe that peace and political progress in international affairs as in domestic affairs depend upon intelligent compromise. The United States Delegation acted in that spirit at Berlin. We acted in that spirit at London. And we shall continue to act in that spirit at future conferences.

That spirit is essential in international conferences where action can be taken only by unanimous agreement. When any one member can prevent agreement, compromise is a necessity. Men and women who have served on a jury can appreciate that.

Compromise, however, does not mean surrender, and compromise unlike surrender requires the assent of more than one party.

The difficulties encountered at the London conference will, I hope, impress upon the peoples of all countries, including our own people, the hard reality that none of us can expect to write the peace in our own way. If this hard reality is accepted by statesmen and peoples at an early stage of the peacemaking process, it may at later stages save us and save the peace of the world from the disastrous effects of disillusionment and intransigences.

Regardless of how Americans may differ as to domestic policies, they desire unity in our foreign policies. This unity will be essential in the days ahead of us when we may expect differences in views by various governments as to peace settlements. However, the political party in power cannot expect this unity unless it freely consults representatives of the opposing political party.

Believing this, I requested Mr. John Foster Dulles, one of the best-informed Americans in the field of foreign relations and a loyal Republican, to accompany me to London in an advisory capacity. He has been more than an adviser; he has been a partner. Between us there have been no secrets. At the Council table and in private conference he has participated in the making of all decisions. Our accord serves to show that in foreign affairs Republicans and Democrats can work together and that in vital matters of foreign policy we Americans are united.

When it was agreed at Berlin to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers<sup>2</sup> I think we all had in mind the precedent of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. There, representatives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States worked together to prepare draft proposals for the United Nations Charter as a basis for discussion with other nations. France was not present at Dumbarton Oaks only because France had not yet been liberated. Her right to permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council was not questioned.

Experience reveals that a certain degree of understanding among the major powers is essential to secure general agreement among many nations. When understanding among the great powers is not achieved in advance of a conference participated in by many nations, it usually has to be secured informally during the conference.

At the Versailles Conference, for example, it took the Big Three and the Big Five so long to agree among themselves that the complaint was

<sup>1</sup> Broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System from Washington on Oct. 5, 1945 at 9:30 p.m. E.S.T.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1945, p. 153.

made that the smaller powers had little more time to consider the treaty than was given to the Germans.

The Berlin agreement envisaged the naming of highranking deputies who could carry on the work of the Council in the absence of their chiefs, the Foreign Secretaries. The Council, as President Truman and I understood it, was to be a sort of combined staff to explore the problems and prepare proposals for the final peace settlements.

At Berlin it certainly was never intended that the three powers present or the five powers constituting the Council should take unto themselves the making of the final peace. The Berlin declaration setting up the Council begins with the statement "The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements."

The Council was not to make the peace settlements but to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements. It certainly was not my intention to agree to any final treaty without first getting the views of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate which must pass upon all treaties before ratification.

The first session of the Council, so far as the personal participation of the Foreign Ministers was concerned, was intended to provide directives for the deputies in the preparation of treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

This work was exploratory—to find out on what points we were in agreement, on what points we differed, and on what points further study and data were required. It is a little naive to suppose that when really vital differences emerge, one nation or another is likely to abandon its position on the first interchange of views.

At this stage it is as important to know and understand wherein we and our Allies differ as wherein we agree. We must understand our points of difference before we can intelligently consider means of reconciling them.

So far as the Italian treaty was concerned I think we made very good progress toward agreement on directives to govern the work of our deputies.

There was ready acceptance of our proposal that Italy should undertake to maintain a bill of rights which will secure the freedoms of speech, religious

worship, political belief, and public meeting envisaged for Italy in the Moscow declaration of November 1943 and which will confirm the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

There was some difference among the conferees at the start as to providing for the limitation of armaments. But it was our feeling that Italy should rely on the United Nations for protection against aggression and should not engage in competition in armaments when all her resources are badly needed to restore her civilian economy. And this view gained general acceptance.

While the very controversial boundary dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy was not settled, it was encouraging to find that it was possible to agree that the line should in the main be governed by ethnic considerations and that regardless of its sovereignty there should be a free port at Trieste under international control.

The Council was in general agreement that the Dodecanese Islands should go to Greece although the assent of one member was qualified pending the study of certain questions by his government.

There was general agreement that the Italian colonies should come under the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter. Various views were expressed as to the preferred form of trusteeship for the colonies.

The American Delegation was particularly gratified that the directive to the deputies, while not restricting their studies, called for special consideration of the American proposal for a truly international administration directly responsible to the United Nations with a view to the attainment of the greatest degree of independence of the inhabitants of two of the colonies at the end of ten years and independence for the people of a third colony at as early a date as possible.

This proposal was presented by the American Delegation when the Italian treaty first was taken up and was consistently adhered to.

It is our view that the object of a trusteeship should be to promote the self-government of the people of a colony and not to enrich a trustee or increase its economic or military power.

It was also agreed that Italian sovereignty should be restored on the conclusion of the treaty so that foreign troops may be withdrawn and, except as specially provided in the treaty, foreign controls within Italy terminated.

There was no definite understanding on reparations. The United States took the position that Italy could not pay anything like \$600,000,000. Apart from certain foreign assets, she should be required to pay as reparations only such factory and tool equipment designed for the manufacture of war implements which are not required for the limited military establishment permitted to her and which cannot be readily converted to peaceful purposes. If she is stripped of more, then her economy cannot be restored.

We have contributed several hundred million dollars for the relief of the Italian people. Their condition is deplorable. We must continue to help them. But we cannot contribute more millions, if those millions are to be used to enable Italy to pay reparations to other governments. We did that for Germany after the last war. We shall not do it again.

Substantial progress was also made on the directives for the preparatory work on the Finnish treaty and the treaties with Rumania and Bulgaria. The principles suggested by the American Delegation and accepted for the Italian treaty for the safeguarding of human rights and fundamental freedoms are also to be incorporated in these treaties.

The directives concerning the limitation of armament for Rumania and Bulgaria are expected to follow the same general line as those accepted for Italy.

Before work could be commenced upon the directives for the Hungarian treaty the Soviet Delegation announced they felt obliged to withdraw their assent to the procedure previously accepted by the Council for dealing with peace treaties.

Before taking up these procedural difficulties I should say a few words about the Soviet Delegation's disappointment with the failure of Great Britain and the United States to recognize the Bulgarian and Rumanian Governments.

The thought apparently exists in their mind that our government objects to these governments because they are friendly to the Soviet Union and that our unwillingness to recognize these governments is a manifestation of unfriendliness to the Soviet Union.

There could be no greater misconception of our attitude. I was at Yalta. The Yalta declaration on the liberated and ex-satellite countries was based on a proposal submitted by President Roose-

velt. Under it the Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union, assumed the responsibility of concerting their policies to assist in the establishment of interim governments broadly representative of all important democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people. That pledge cannot be fulfilled in countries where freedom of speech and of assembly are denied.

That policy sponsored by President Roosevelt was America's policy and remains America's policy.

We are well aware that no government is perfect and that the representative character of any provisional government will always be subject to debate. We do not demand perfection where perfection is unobtainable.

In an effort to concert our policies with our Allies we have tried to show a spirit of conciliation. Certainly we did not make unduly exacting the requirements we set before we recognized the Provisional Polish Government or the conditions which we have proposed as a basis for the recognition of the Provisional Hungarian Government.<sup>1</sup>

And I hope that as the result of efforts now being made by the Provisional Austrian Government to broaden its representation, we may soon be able to recognize that Government.

At Berlin we stated we would examine in the near future, in the light of prevailing conditions, the question of recognition of Rumania and Bulgaria. We have investigated and we shall continue to investigate. But we cannot know whether conditions justify recognition unless our political representatives are fully informed and unless our news correspondents are permitted freely to enter countries and freely to send their stories uncensored.

We do not seek to dictate the internal affairs of any people. We only reserve for ourselves the right to refuse to recognize governments if after investigation we conclude they have not given to the people the rights pledged to them in the Yalta agreement and in the Atlantic Charter.

The peace of Europe depends upon the existence of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and its European neighbors, and two wars in one generation have convinced the American people that they have a very vital interest in the maintenance of peace in Europe.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 8, 1945, p. 47.

The American Government shares the desire of the Soviet Union to have governments friendly to the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe.

But lasting peace depends not only upon friendship between governments but upon friendship between peoples.

Had it not been for the difficulties experienced by the Allied governments in agreeing upon a common policy in regard to the recognition of the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria a more conciliatory spirit might possibly have prevailed and might greatly have helped to overcome the procedural difficulties of the Council.

No one present at the Council on September 11 questioned the decision taken by the Council that day inviting all five members to be present at all meetings.

Directives for the Italian treaty were under discussion for several days with China, not a party to the surrender terms, present, participating in the discussion, but not voting. No one objected.

Directives for the Finnish treaty were then considered, with the United States, France, and China present but not voting. No one objected.

Directives for the Rumanian treaty and then for the Bulgarian treaty were considered, with France and China present but not voting. No one objected.

It was only on September 22 that the Soviet Delegation took the position that the decision of the Council on September 11 violated the Berlin agreement.

It will be recalled that the Berlin agreement set up a Council of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, and the United States to undertake the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements. It provided that the Council should draw up with a view to their submission to the United Nations peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

It provided that in the discharge of these tasks the Council will be composed of members representing those states which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy state concerned, and for the purpose of the Italian settlement France should be regarded as signatory to the surrender terms.

The Berlin agreement further provided that other members of the Council will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

This distinction between members of the Council who were parties to the surrender terms and those who were not, was not part of the original American proposal and was reluctantly accepted by us. We were fully aware that a member would not have the right to vote if not a party to the surrender terms, but we understood from the exchange of views at the table that all members would be allowed to participate in all discussions in the Council.

It certainly never occurred to President Truman or myself that any of the five members of the Council who are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which is charged with the responsibility for maintaining the peace which the Council of Foreign Ministers is preparing, would not be invited to be present during the discussions of the treaties.

Such exclusion of two permanent members of the Security Council would not promote the harmonious relations essential to the success of the United Nations Organization.

The Soviet Delegation's position was not simply that they wished to withdraw the invitation to China and France to participate without right to vote. Their position was that it was beyond the authority of the States signatory to the surrender terms to extend the invitation.

Although this construction of the Berlin agreement did not accord with the understanding of the American Delegation or the British Delegation or the President of the United States or the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Soviet Delegation insisted that they could no longer discuss treaty matters in the presence of members who were not parties to the surrender terms.

Thereafter the meetings of the Council for a number of days were confined to the discussion of other items on the agenda such as international inland waterways, the Ruhr, acceleration of German reparations, restitution, repatriation of Allied nationals, and the Austrian food supply.

When the general items on the agenda were exhausted, agreement had not been reached for solving the procedural obstacles which, in the view of the Soviet Delegation, made further discussion of treaty matters impossible until the decision of September 11 should be rescinded.

Since it had always been my view that the Berlin agreement contemplated a broadening out of the participants before the final conclusion of a

peace treaty, I sought to find a compromise along that line.

The Berlin agreement expressly provided in section 4 of the article establishing the Council that the Council may adapt its procedures to the particular problems under discussion; that in some cases it may hold its own discussions prior to the participation of other interested states; and in other cases it may convoke a formal conference of states interested in particular problems.

I therefore proposed, with considerable reluctance, that we ask our French and Chinese colleagues to accept the position of the Soviet Delegation that the preparatory and exploratory work of the Council for the peace settlements be confined to the signatories of the surrender terms in question, provided that at the same time it should be agreed that a truly representative peace conference should be convoked before the end of the year. To ensure the calling of such a conference we thought that France and China, in the interest of peace, might make even this sacrifice.

This conference would be convoked for the purpose of considering the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. To the conference would be invited:

(1) The five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers which are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;

(2) All European members of the United Nations;

(3) All non-European members of the United Nations which supplied substantial military contingents in the war against the European members of the Axis.

The American Delegation took the position that, in an interdependent, democratic world, peace cannot be the exclusive concern of a few presently powerful states; that unless we were to revert to a world of isolationism none of the states which we wanted invited to the peace conference could be said to be not directly concerned in the peace.

We urged that those states, both large and small, which had fought and suffered in the war must make the peace. This has been a peoples' war and it must be a peoples' peace.

The Soviet Delegation stated, however, that they could not agree to the American proposal for a peace conference until they had returned to Moscow and had personal consultations with their Government.

It therefore became obvious that there could be no agreement unless the other delegations were prepared to yield their views and convictions to those of the Soviet Delegation. This none of the other delegations was prepared to do.

The United States is willing to dictate terms of peace to an enemy but is not willing to dictate terms of peace to its Allies.

Our task then became one of arranging an adjournment until the Soviet Delegation could return to Moscow. It is customary before adjournment to adopt and have all conferees to sign a protocol containing a record of the agreed decisions of a conference. The Soviet Delegation would not agree to the inclusion in the protocol of the decision of September 11 that the five members should participate in all meetings, even though it included a statement of the action taken by the Soviet Delegation on September 22 to withdraw their assent to that decision.

On the last day of the session the Soviet Delegation announced it would offer a compromise proposal. The proposal was that there should be four separate protocols without recording in any of them the decision of September 11 which had been agreed to by them but which they later wished to rescind. This was the same position that they had urged for days. The only thing new about it was the suggestion that on the following day they would discuss unsettled questions including the American proposal for a peace conference and the disputed September 11 decision.

In answer to a question the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that while he could discuss the proposal for a peace conference, he still was without authority to act upon it. The proposal had been discussed for a week. Further discussion without action was futile.

It was also obvious that once the four protocols were signed, it would be useless on the following day to discuss the question of inserting in the protocols the decision of September 11. An objection by the Soviet Delegation would prevent its insertion.

The Soviet Delegation also reiterated their position that they would not discuss the treaties in the presence of members they now believed to be ineligible. This would have excluded China from the consideration of all treaties and France from the consideration of all but one, without any assurance of participation in a peace conference.

It became apparent that agreement was impossible and further meetings were useless. The Chinese Foreign Minister, who was presiding when the Council adjourned and at whose instance the Council had remained in session from Sunday until Tuesday, stated that under the circumstances he could not ask the Council to continue in session longer.

As the record stands the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has not rejected our proposal for a peace conference. During the discussions he admitted it was correct in principle. My hope is that, after he has conferred with his government, his government will agree that the nations that fought the war—the World War—shall have a chance to make the world peace.

The matter that caused the suspension of our work is no trivial or technical question. It presented an issue that had to be met. It is whether the peace shall be made by three or even five nations to the exclusion of other nations vitally concerned in the maintenance and enforcement of the peace which is being prepared.

The issue goes even deeper. The Council of Foreign Ministers acts under the unanimity rule just as the Security Council of the United Nations must act in many important matters, but in the Security Council no nation has the veto power in procedural matters while in the Council of Foreign Ministers one nation can veto all action.

The veto power is a great power and should not be lightly exercised. We are willing to make many concessions but the United States does not believe in agreement at any price.

The power of veto in procedural matters should not be used by the United States or any other nation to coerce the judgment and conscience of fellow nations.

Peace must be based upon mutual understanding and mutual respect. It can not be secured by procedural maneuverings which obscure from the people the real and vital issues upon which their peace depends.

Undeterred by temporary set-backs and ever willing to accord to others that tolerant understanding that we wish others to accord to us, we must not relax in our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace for ourselves and all nations. "With firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in."

## Financial and Trade Discussions With United Kingdom

### JOINT STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

[Released to the press October 1]

The initial meeting of the Commercial Policy Committee of the United States - United Kingdom economic negotiations was held at 11 a.m. today in the Department of State. The Honorable William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for economic affairs, presided. The other members of the United States Delegation at the meeting were the Honorable Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Commerce; Dr. Harry White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman of the Tariff Commission; and Mr. Leslie Wheeler, Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the Department of Agriculture.

The members of the United Kingdom Delegation at the meeting were the Right Honorable the Earl of Halifax, K.G., Ambassador to the United States; Lord Keynes, Adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Sir Percivale Liesching of the Board of Trade; Mr. R. H. Brand, Head of the United Kingdom Treasury Delegation in Washington; Professor Lionel Robbins of the Cabinet Offices; and Mr. R. J. Shackle of the Board of Trade.

The purpose of the meetings of the Commercial Policy Committee will be to discuss, within the framework of article VII of the United States - United Kingdom mutual-aid agreement, the broad aspects of future trade relations between the two countries. The Committee will discuss tariffs and discriminatory arrangements, quantitative restrictions, and other barriers to trade; international policy with respect to commodity agreements and the control of international cartels; the establishment of an international trade organization; and international cooperation in the maintenance of employment.

# Statement by the Secretary of State on the Meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press October 3]

The Council of Foreign Ministers at its initial series of meetings dealt with many matters in accordance with the directive from the Berlin Conference to continue the preparatory work for the peace settlements with a view to submitting their conclusions to the United Nations. The present meeting is the first meeting of the principal Allies to be held since the fighting has stopped, and there emerged differences of views which had not appeared so long as the first imperative was to preserve fighting unity. There was a considerable area of agreement. The differences which developed were explored in a spirit of conciliation, and there is good reason to believe that with continued patience and understanding on all sides agreement on essentials can be attained. We are determined upon that outcome. Toward the conclusion of the present series of meetings procedural difficulties arose. The Soviet Delegation came to feel that treaty discussions should be confined in each case to the signatories of the surrender terms as contemplated by the first and narrow provision of article II 3. (ii) of the Berlin agreement rather than under other and broader provisions of the Berlin agreement.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Delegation on September 22 took the position that the Council should rescind or withdraw its September eleventh decision whereby France and China were invited to participate in all discussions.<sup>3</sup> This would have meant the elimination of China from the pending discussion of the European peace treaties and the similar elimination of France except in the case of the treaty with Italy. The Secretary of State of the United States took the position that he would be reluctant to see such narrowing of participation in the pending work on the European peace treaties and the elimination therefrom of two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. He would, however, accept any preliminary treaty-

making procedure which was consistent with the Berlin agreement provided the Council agreed as authorized by article II 4. (ii) of the Berlin agreement to call a peace conference of the principally interested states. Such a conference should include the permanent members of the Security Council, the European members of the United Nations, and non-European members which supplied substantial military contingents against the European members of the Axis. The conference would review the preliminary treaty work of the Council. The Soviet Delegation took the position that without personal consultation with their Government they could not make any commitment with reference to such a future peace conference. In the circumstances, work of the Council will be held in abeyance. If, as we confidently hope, agreement regarding future procedure is obtained, the drafting work of the deputies can then go forward on the basis of directives already given the deputies by the Council.

## Charter of the United Nations

[Released to the press October 1]

### China

Wei Tao-ming, Ambassador of China, deposited with the Department of State on September 28 the Chinese instrument of ratification of the Charter of the United Nations and the annexed Statute of the International Court of Justice.

### Turkey

Hüseyin Ragip Baydur, Ambassador of Turkey, deposited with the Department of State on September 28 the Turkish instrument of ratification of the Charter and Statute.

Ten nations have now deposited their instruments of ratification of the Charter in the order listed: United States, France, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador, China, and Turkey.

<sup>1</sup> Made in London on Oct. 2, 1945.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1945, p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1945, p. 392.

# International Control of Atomic Energy

## EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS

[Released to the press by the White House October 3]

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Almost two months have passed since the atomic bomb was used against Japan. That bomb did not win the war, but it certainly shortened the war. We know that it saved the lives of untold thousands of American and Allied soldiers who would otherwise have been killed in battle.

The discovery of the means of releasing atomic energy began a new era in the history of civilization. The scientific and industrial knowledge on which this discovery rests does not relate merely to another weapon. It may some day prove to be more revolutionary in the development of human society than the invention of the wheel, the use of metals, or the steam or internal-combustion engine.

Never in history has society been confronted with a power so full of potential danger and at the same time so full of promise for the future of man and for the peace of the world. I think I express the faith of the American people when I say that we can use the knowledge we have won, not for the devastation of war, but for the future welfare of humanity.

To accomplish that objective we must proceed along two fronts—the domestic and the international.

The other phase of the problem is the question of the international control and development of this newly discovered energy.

In international relations as in domestic affairs, the release of atomic energy constitutes a new force too revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas. We can no longer rely on the slow progress of time to develop a program of control among nations. Civilization demands that we shall reach at the earliest possible date a satisfactory arrangement for the control of this discovery in order that it may become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace instead of an instrument of destruction.

Scientific opinion appears to be practically

unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time.

The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing and encouraging the use of atomic energy and all future scientific information toward peaceful and humanitarian ends. The difficulties in working out such arrangements are great. The alternative to overcoming these difficulties, however, may be a desperate armament race which might well end in disaster. Discussion of the international problem cannot be safely delayed until the United Nations Organization is functioning and in a position adequately to deal with it.

I therefore propose to initiate discussions, first with our associates in this discovery, Great Britain and Canada, and then with other nations, in an effort to effect agreement on the conditions under which cooperation might replace rivalry in the field of atomic power.

I desire to emphasize that these discussions will not be concerned with disclosures relating to the manufacturing processes leading to the production of the atomic bomb itself. They will constitute an effort to work out arrangements covering the terms under which international collaboration and exchange of scientific information might safely proceed.

The outcome of the discussions will be reported to the Congress as soon as possible, and any resulting agreements requiring congressional action will be submitted to the Congress.

But regardless of the course of discussions in the international field, I believe it is essential that legislation along the lines I have indicated be adopted as promptly as possible to insure the necessary research in, and development and control of, the production and use of atomic energy.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

October 3, 1945

# Arrangements for Control of Germany by Allied Representatives

## AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC ON CERTAIN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO BE IMPOSED ON GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

*The Governments of the U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. and Provisional Government of French Republic have reached the following agreement regarding instructions to be issued by the Allied representatives in Germany:*

We, the Allied Representatives, Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of occupation of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, pursuant to the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945,<sup>2</sup> hereby announce certain additional requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply, as follows:—

### SECTION I

1. All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in accordance with methods and procedures to be laid down by the Allied Representatives.

2. All forms of military training, military propaganda and military activities of whatever nature, on the part of the German people, are prohibited, as well as the formation of any organization initiated to further any aspect of military training and the formation of war veterans' organizations or other groups which might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry

on the German military tradition, whether such organizations or groups purport to be political, educational, religious, social, athletic or recreational or of any other nature.

### SECTION II

3. (a) German authorities and officials in all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on 31st December, 1937, and in any areas within those frontiers indicated at any time by the Allied Representatives, will comply with such instructions as to withdrawing therefrom as they may receive from the Allied Representatives.

(b) The German authorities will issue the necessary instructions and will make the necessary arrangements for the reception and maintenance in Germany of all German civilian inhabitants of the territories or areas concerned, whose evacuation may be ordered by the Allied Representatives.

(c) Withdrawals and evacuations under subparagraphs (a) and (b) above will take place at such times and under such conditions as the Allied Representatives may direct.

4. In the territories and areas referred to in paragraph 3 above, there shall immediately be, on the part of all forces under German command and of German authorities and civilians, a complete cessation of all measures of coercion or forced labor and of all measures involving injury to life or limb. There shall similarly cease all measures of requisitioning, seizure, removal, concealment or destruction of property. In particular, the withdrawals and evacuations mentioned in paragraph 3 above will be carried out without damage to or removal of persons or property not affected by the orders of the Allied Representatives. The Allied Representatives will determine what personal property and effects may be taken by persons evacuated under paragraph 3 above.

### SECTION III

5. The Allied Representatives will regulate all matters affecting Germany's relations with other

<sup>1</sup> Made in Berlin Sept. 20, 1945.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 10, 1945, p. 1051.

countries. No foreign obligations, undertakings or commitments of any kind will be assumed or entered into by or on behalf of German authorities or nationals without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

6. The Allied Representatives will give directions concerning the abrogation, bringing into force, revival or application of any treaty, convention or other international agreement, or any part or provision thereof, to which Germany is or has been a party.

7. (a) In virtue of the unconditional surrender of Germany, and as of the date of such surrender, the diplomatic, consular, commercial and other relations of the German State with other States have ceased to exist.

(b) Diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of service missions in Germany of countries at war with any of the four Powers will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. The Allied Representatives may require the withdrawal from Germany of neutral diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of neutral service missions.

(c) All German diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of German service missions abroad are hereby recalled. The control and disposal of the buildings, property and archives of all German diplomatic and other agencies abroad will be prescribed by the Allied Representatives.

8. (a) German nationals will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving German territory except as authorized or directed by the Allied Representatives.

(b) German authorities and nationals will comply with any directions issued by the Allied Representatives for the recall of German nationals resident abroad, and for the reception in Germany of any persons whom the Allied Representatives may designate.

9. The German authorities and people will take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety, maintenance and welfare of persons not of German nationality and of their property and the property of foreign States.

#### SECTION IV

10. The German authorities will place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inter-communication system (in-

cluding all military and civilian postal and tele-communication systems and facilities and connected matters), and will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for placing such inter-communication systems under the complete control of the Allied Representatives. The German authorities will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives with a view to the establishment by the Allied Representatives of such censorship and control of postal and telecommunication and of documents and other articles carried by persons or otherwise conveyed and of all other forms of inter-communication as the Allied Representatives may think fit.

11. The German authorities will comply with all directions which the Allied Representatives may give regarding the use, control and censorship of all media for influencing expression and opinions, including broadcasting, press and publications, advertising, films and public performances, entertainments, and exhibitions of all kinds.

#### SECTION V

12. The Allied Representatives will exercise such control as they deem necessary over all or any part or aspect of German finance, agriculture (including forestry) production and mining, public utilities, industry, trade, distribution and economy generally, internal and external, and over all related or ancillary matters, including the direction or prohibition of the manufacture, production, construction, treatment, use and disposal of any buildings, establishments, installations, public or private works, plant, equipment, products, materials, stocks, or resources. Detailed statements of the subjects to which the present provision applies, together with the requirements of the Allied Representatives in regard thereto, will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities.

13. (a) The manufacture, production and construction, and the acquisition from outside Germany, of war material and of such other products used in connection with such manufacture, production or construction, as the Allied Representatives may specify, and the import, export and transit thereof, are prohibited, except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

(b) The German authorities will immediately place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives all research, experiment, development and design

directly or indirectly relating to war or the production of war material, whether in government or private establishments, factories, technological institutions or elsewhere.

14. (a) The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany) of the German State, its political subdivisions, the German Central Bank, State or semi-State, provincial, municipal or local authorities or Nazi organizations, and those situated outside Germany of any person resident or carrying on business in Germany, will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany), of such private companies, corporations, trusts, cartels, firms, partnerships and associations as may be designated by the Allied Representatives will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

(b) The German authorities will furnish full information about the property, assets, rights, titles and interests referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, and will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may give as to their transfer and disposal. Without prejudice to any further demands which may be made in this connection, the German authorities will hold at the disposal of the Allied Representatives for delivery to them at such times and places as they may direct all securities, certificates, deeds or other documents of title held by any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above or by any person subject to German law, and relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated in the territories of the United Nations, including any shares, stocks, debentures or other obligations of any company incorporated in accordance with the laws of any of the United Nations.

(c) Property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany will not be removed outside Germany or be transferred or disposed of to any person resident or carrying on business outside Germany without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

(d) Nothing in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above shall, as regards property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany, be deemed to prevent sales or transfers to persons

resident in Germany for the purpose of maintaining or carrying on the day-to-day national life, economy and administration, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph 19 (b) and (c) below and to the provisions of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

15. (a) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over to the Allied Representatives all gold and silver, in coin or bullion forms, and all platinum in bullion form, situated in Germany, and all such coin and bullion situated outside Germany as is possessed by or held on behalf of any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in sub-paragraph 14 (a) above or any person resident or carrying on business in Germany.

(b) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over in full to the Allied Representatives all foreign notes and coins in the possession of any German authority, or of any corporation, association or individual resident or carrying on business in Germany, and all monetary tokens issued or prepared for issue by Germany in the territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere.

16. (a) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities, or held for or belonging to the nationals of any such country, or of any persons resident or carrying on business therein, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions.

(b) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to private individuals, private enterprises and companies of those countries, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, which have at any time since the 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions.

(c) The German authorities will take all necessary steps to ensure the execution of the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for that purpose, and will afford all necessary information and facilities in connection therewith.

17. (a) There shall, on the part of the German

authorities and people, be no concealment, destruction, scuttling, or dismantling of, removal or transfer of, nor damage to, ships, transport, ports or harbours, nor to any form of building, establishment, installation, device, means of production, supply, distribution or communication, plant, equipment, currency, stocks or resources, or, in general, public or private works, utilities or facilities of any kind, wherever situated.

(b) There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, suppression or alteration of any documents, records, patents, drawings, specifications, plans or information, of any nature, affected by the provisions of this document. They shall be kept intact in their present locations until further directions are given. The German authorities will afford all information and facilities as required by the Allied Representatives in connection therewith.

(c) Any measures already ordered, undertaken or begun contrary to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will be immediately countermanded or discontinued. All stocks, equipment, plant, records, patents, documents, drawings, specifications, plans or other material already concealed within or outside Germany will forthwith be declared and will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may direct.

(d) Subject to the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances, or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and people will be responsible for the preservation, safeguarding and upkeep of all forms of property and materials affected by any of the said provisions.

(e) All transport material, stores, equipment, plant, establishments, installations, devices and property generally, which are liable to be surrendered or delivered under the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, will be handed over intact and in good condition, or subject only to ordinary wear and tear and to any damage caused during the continuance of hostilities which it has proved impossible to make good.

18. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with, or dealings with or for the benefit of, countries at war with any of the United Nations, or territories occupied by such countries, or with any other country or person specified by the Allied Representatives.

## SECTION VI

19. (a) The German authorities will carry out, for the benefit of the United Nations, such measures of restitution, reinstatement, restoration, reparation, reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. For these purposes the German authorities will effect or procure the surrender or transfer of such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, effect such deliveries and carry out such repair, building and construction work, whether in Germany or elsewhere, and will provide such transport, plant equipment and materials of all kinds, labour, personnel and specialist and other services, for use in Germany or elsewhere, as the Allied Representatives may direct.

(b) The German authorities will also comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests located in Germany belonging to any one of the United Nations or its nationals or having so belonged at, or at any time since, the outbreak of war between Germany and that Nation, or since the occupation of any part of its territories by Germany. The German authorities will be responsible for safeguarding, maintaining, and preventing the dissipation of, all such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, and for handing them over intact at the demand of the Allied Representatives. For these purposes the German authorities will afford all information and facilities required for tracing any property, assets, rights, titles or interests.

(c) All persons in Germany in whose possession such property, assets, rights, titles and interests may be, shall be personally responsible for reporting them and for safeguarding them until they are handed over in such manner as may be prescribed.

20. The German authorities will supply free of cost such German currency as the Allied Representatives may require, and will withdraw and redeem in German currency, within such time limits and on such terms as the Allied Representatives may specify, all holdings in German territory of currencies issued by the Allied Representatives during military operations or occupation, and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the Allied Representatives.

21. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as may be issued by the Allied

Representatives for defraying the costs of the provisioning, maintenance, pay, accommodation and transport of the forces and agencies stationed in Germany by authority of the Allied Representatives, the costs of executing the requirements of unconditional surrender, and payment for any relief in whatever form it may be provided by the United Nations.

22. The Allied Representatives will take and make unrestricted use (whether inside or outside Germany) of any articles referred to in paragraph 12 above, which the Allied Representatives may require in connection with the conduct of hostilities against any country with which any of their respective Governments is at war.

## SECTION VII

23. (a) No merchant ship, including fishing or other craft, shall put to sea from any German port except as may be sanctioned or directed by the Allied Representatives. German ships in ports outside Germany shall remain in port and those at sea shall proceed to the nearest German or United Nations port and there remain, pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

(b) All German merchant shipping, including tonnage under construction or repair, will be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe.

(c) Foreign merchant shipping in German service or under German control will likewise be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe. In the case of such foreign merchant vessels which are of neutral registration, the German authorities will take all such steps as may be required by the Allied Representatives to transfer or cause to be transferred to the Allied Representatives all rights relative thereto.

(d) All transfer to any other flag, service or control, of the vessels covered by sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) above, is prohibited, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

24. Any existing options to repurchase or reacquire or to resume control of vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered by Germany during the war will be exercised as directed by the Allied Representatives. Such vessels will be made available for use by the Allied Representatives in the same manner as the vessels covered by sub-paragraphs 23 (b) and (c) above.

25. (a) The crews of all German merchant vessels or merchant vessels in German service or under German control will remain on board and will be maintained by the German authorities pending further instructions from the Allied Representatives regarding their future employment.

(b) Cargoes on board any such vessels will be disposed of in accordance with instructions given to the German authorities by the Allied Representatives.

26. (a) Merchant ships, including fishing and other craft of the United Nations (or of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Germany) which are in German hands, wherever such ships may be, will be surrendered to the Allied Representatives regardless of whether title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. All such ships will be surrendered in good repair and in seaworthy condition in ports and at times to be specified by the Allied Representatives, for disposal as directed by them.

(b) The German authorities will take all such steps as may be directed by the Allied Representatives to effect or complete transfers of title to such ships regardless of whether the title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. They will secure the discontinuance of any arrests of, or proceedings against, such ships in neutral ports.

27. The German authorities will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the destruction, dispersal, salvaging, reclamation or raising of wrecked, stranded, derelict or sunken vessels, wherever they may be situated. Such vessels salvaged, reclaimed or raised shall be dealt with as the Allied Representatives direct.

28. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives the entire German shipping, shipbuilding and ship repair industries, and all matters and facilities directly or indirectly relative or ancillary thereto, and will provide the requisite labour and specialist services. The requirements of the Allied Representatives will be specified in instructions which will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities.

## SECTION VIII

29. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representa-

tives the whole of the German inland transport system (road, rail, air and waterways) and all connected material, plant and equipment, and all repair, construction, labour, servicing and running facilities, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Representatives.

30. The production in Germany and the possession, maintenance or operation by Germans of any aircraft of any kind or any parts thereof, are prohibited.

31. All German rights in international transport bodies or organizations, and in relation to the use of transport and the movement of traffic in other countries and the use in Germany of the transport of other countries, will be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Allied Representatives.

32. All facilities for the generation, transmission and distribution of power, including establishments for the manufacture and repair of such facilities, will be placed under the complete control of the Allied Representatives, to be used for such purposes as they may designate.

#### SECTION IX

33. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the regulation of movements of population and for controlling travel or removal on the part of persons in Germany.

34. No person may leave or enter Germany without a permit issued by the Allied Representatives or on their authority.

35. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the repatriation of persons not of German nationality in or passing through Germany, their property and effects, and for facilitating the movements of refugees and displaced persons.

#### SECTION X

36. The German authorities will furnish any information and documents, and will secure the attendance of any witnesses, required by the Allied Representatives for the trial of

(a) the principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as

being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences:

(b) any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives;

and will give all other aid and assistance for these purposes.

37. The German authorities will comply with any directions given by the Allied Representatives in regard to the property of any person referred to in sub-paragraphs 36 (a) and (b) above, such as its seizure, custody or surrender.

#### SECTION XI

38. The National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) is completely and finally abolished and declared to be illegal.

39. The German authorities will comply promptly with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the abolition of the National Socialist Party and of its subordinate organizations, affiliated associations and supervised organizations, and of all Nazi public institutions created as instruments of Nazi domination, and of such other organizations as may be regarded as a threat to the security of the Allied forces or to international peace, and for prohibiting their revival in any form; for the dismissal and internment of Nazi personnel; for the control or seizure of Nazi property and funds; and for the suppression of Nazi ideology and teaching.

40. The German authorities and German nationals will not allow the existence of any secret organizations.

41. The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the repeal of Nazi legislation and for the reform of German law and of the German legal, judicial, administrative, police and educational systems, including the replacement of their personnel.

42. (a) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the rescinding of German legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions and for the cancellation of all legal or other disabilities resulting therefrom.

(b) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue regarding the property, assets, rights, titles and interests of persons affected by legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions.

43. No person shall be prosecuted or molested by the German authorities or by German nationals on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions, or on account of any dealings or sympathies with the United Nations, including the performance of any action calculated to facilitate the execution of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

44. In any proceedings before any German Court or authority judicial notice shall be taken of the provisions of the Declaration and of all proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, which shall override any provisions of German law inconsistent therewith.

## SECTION XII

45. Without prejudice to any specific obligations contained in the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and any other person in a position to do so will furnish or cause to be furnished all such information and documents of every kind, public and private, as the Allied Representatives may require.

46. The German authorities will likewise produce for interrogation and employment by the Allied Representatives upon demand any and all persons whose knowledge and experience would be useful to the Allied Representatives.

47. The Allied Representatives will have access at all times to any building, installation, establishment, property or area, and any of the contents thereof, for the purposes of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, and in particular for the purposes of safeguarding, inspecting, copying or obtaining any of the desired documents and information. The German authorities will give all necessary facilities and assistance for this purpose, including the service of all specialist staff, including archivists.

## SECTION XIII

48. In the event of any doubt as to the meaning or interpretation of any term or expression in the Declaration and in any proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, the decision of the Allied Representatives shall be final.

## Termination of Treaties

### Siam-Japan

The Siamese Legation informed the Department in a note dated October 1, 1945 that on September 26, 1945 the Siamese Minister of Foreign Affairs announced by cable to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs the termination of certain agreements concluded between Siam and Japan. The first was the treaty concerning the continuance of friendly relations with, and mutual respect of, each other's territorial integrity, signed at Tokyo on June 12, 1940. Also terminated was the protocol concerning guaranties and political understanding of May 9, 1941 as well as all existing agreements of a political nature.

The Legation stated that in announcing the above-mentioned action the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Siam declared that the formal denunciation of all treaties, agreements, and arrangements of a political nature concluded with Japan during the period of Luang Pibul's premiership had now been completed.<sup>1</sup>

## Visit of Bolivian Educator

[Released to the press October 3]

Dr. Martín Cárdenas, Rector of the University of Cochabamba, in Bolivia, is guest of the Department of State while conferring with agricultural experts on plant breeding techniques, with especial reference to the potato and Indian corn. His present visit will include several weeks' study of the work in plant exploration and introduction carried on by the Department of Agriculture at Beltsville, Maryland. He will also visit the Virginia University Experimental Farm at Boyce, the Botanical Museum and Gray Herbarium at Harvard, the College of Agriculture of Cornell, similar centers of agricultural research, and western potato-producing regions.

<sup>1</sup> See BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 498.

# United States Delegation to Conference on Food and Agriculture

[Released to the press by the White House October 3]

The President has designated the following persons as members of the United States Delegation to the first session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, to be held at Quebec, Canada, October 16, 1945.

*United States Member:*

CLINTON P. ANDERSON, Secretary of Agriculture

*Deputy United States Member:*

WILLIAM L. CLAYTON, Assistant Secretary of State

*Alternate United States Member:*

HOWARD R. TOLLEY, United States Representative on the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture

*Congressional Advisers:*

ELMER THOMAS, United States Senate, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry

RAYMOND E. WILLIS, United States Senate, Member, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry

JOHN W. FLANNAGAN, JR., United States House of Representatives, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture

CLIFFORD R. HOPE, United States House of Representatives, Member, Committee on Agriculture

*Advisers:*

ANDREW W. ANDERSON, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

PAUL APPLEBY, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget  
H. G. BENNETT, President, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College

HUGH BENNETT, Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture

HOMER L. BRINKLEY, President, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives

R. E. BUCHANAN, Director, Agricultural Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa

EDWARD G. CALE, Acting Associate Chief, Commodities Division, Department of State

P. V. CARDON, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture

A. L. DEERING, Dean, College of Agriculture, University of Maine

MORDECAI EZEKIEL, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture

ALBERT S. GOSS, Master, the National Grange

HENRY S. GRAVES, College of Forestry, Yale University

L. WENDELL HAYES, Divisional Assistant, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

EDWARD I. KOTOK, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

EDWARD A. O'NEAL, President, American Farm Bureau Federation

THOMAS PARRAN, Surgeon General, United States Public Health Service

JAMES G. PATTON, President, National Farmers Union  
HAZEL K. STIEBELING, Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics, Department of Agriculture

LEROY D. STINEBOWER, Deputy Director, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State

ANNA LORD STRAUSS, President, National League of Women Voters

CLIFFORD C. TAYLOR, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Ottawa, Canada

LYLE F. WATTS, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

L. A. WHEELER, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

M. L. WILSON, Extension Service, Department of Agriculture

*Press-Relations Officer:*

HENRY JARRETT, Special Assistant, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture

*Secretaries of Delegation:*

JAMES G. MADDOX, Department of Agriculture  
One officer from the Department of State

## Foreign Commerce Weekly

The following articles of interest to readers of the BULLETIN appeared in the September 29 issue of *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, a publication of the Department of Commerce, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Italian Economy Today", from the American Embassy at Rome.

"An Egyptian Industry", from the American Legation at Cairo.

The following article appeared in the issue for Oct. 6:

"Insecticide Output Grows in U.K. and Eire", by Mulford A. Colebrook, second secretary, consul, and Irven M. Eitreim, third secretary, vice consul, American Embassy, London, and by Charles M. Gerrity, vice consul, American Legation, Dublin.

# An American's View of France

BY CAMDEN H. McVEY<sup>1</sup>

**T**HERE IS NO SECRET about the fact that our relations with France in recent months have been far from smooth.

The question that has troubled us all, French and American alike, is how, in view of our historic friendship, this could have come about. The explanation must be sought in the developments of the past few years.

To understand the France of today we must, in my opinion, accept the premise that she is recovering not only from great physical damage but also from deep emotional wounds. The French Government's decision in 1940 to capitulate rather than suffer a possible massacre of its Army and civilian population, unpopular as it was with the rest of the Allied world, left an even deeper mark on the sensibilities of the French. I do not believe that the American people, individually or collectively, could even approach the depths of shame and humiliation which the French have suffered, and from which, in ways scarcely understandable to us, they are trying to recover. I am inclined to believe that the typical American reaction to a total collapse in the face of an overwhelming enemy would be first disbelief, then hot anger at our leaders and our friends as well as our foes, and ultimately a dogged concentration on a revenge that would be as sure in our own minds as it would be sweet. I doubt that any deep sense of shame would form even a subconscious part of our emotions. Not so with France. Almost every action she has taken in the past four years indicates that France is trying to erase the memory of the first time in her history that she has laid down her arms before it was obviously inevitable. Because France was a great power, this action was, more to her than to anyone else, *lèse majesté*. It did not occur to France, or to the rest of the world, to blame smaller countries for exactly similar actions; but, because

great things were expected of France, France took the disappointment of the world deep into her soul as her personal shame and humiliation. Her behavior, both national and individual, has been plainly conditioned by this psychological depression ever since. Her emphasis on rearmament, for instance, and on taking an active and important role in Allied military operations was a work of supererogation—not demanded of her or any other prostrate nation. But to France it was redemption and salvation, the only road to recovery of an honor viewed as lost.

Heartsick as France may be, this is not her only wound. The French estimate of loss of national wealth, 45 percent, may be pessimistic; but there can be no doubt that she has been so ravaged by war that her economic convalescence will be slow and faltering. Unable and unwilling to build up her productive capacity under German rule, she finds herself far behind those nations whose very contribution to the war carried with it a super-human effort to increase production. While other nations were growing stronger, France was of necessity growing weaker. Add to this the direct devastation of the years of bombing and the months of fighting on her soil and one can understand that no other nation of her pre-war stature has suffered so great a loss in competitive position. This war-borne economic retrogression is, in my opinion, one reason, in addition to the psychological effects of her capitulation, why France has sought solace in the more spectacular field of military exploits, where she felt her endeavors could be measured in terms of courage and skill rather than of comparative contribution.

France asked for and received well over a billion dollars in lend-lease armaments. Taking this *matériel* into battle, she has suffered nearly 330,000 casualties in killed, missing, and wounded, not counting the million-odd prisoners still not all accounted for. With 140,000 killed and missing and 187,000 wounded, her sacrifices will bear comparison, proportionately, with those of any of her

<sup>1</sup>Mr. McVey is an adviser in the War Areas Economic Division, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State.

Allies except the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

She has sacrificed her civilian economy time and again in an effort to recoup her military prestige, frequently against the strong protests of her Allies—as in the case of her mass mobilizations—rather than play a lesser role in military operations. Her willingness to subordinate her civilian interests to military demands is illustrated further by the fact that France has supplied, from a minimum civilian economy maintained in part by imports for which she will pay largely in cash, around \$500,000,000 worth of reverse lend-lease for our own Army. Her military lend-lease and civilian import accounts with the United States from 1942 to V-J Day would be in round figures about as follows:

Military lend-lease received . . . . .	\$1,000,000,000
Reverse lend-lease to United States Army . . . . .	500,000,000

Civilian lend-lease received . . . . .	150,000,000
Civilian imports—cash reimbursement . . . . .	400,000,000
Total civilian imports . . . . .	\$550,000,000

### North Africa

When we landed in North Africa we cut off continental Europe, the main source of supply for all manufactured products. We had no ready substitute to replace these vital imports. Straight lend-lease of civilian goods to North Africa was rejected on the theory, as later noted in the *modus vivendi* agreement, that the dollar expenditures of our forces in that theater would obviate the need for civilian lend-lease. It was months before we moved in goods in any substantial quantities, and our shipments (outside of coal from the United Kingdom) never exceeded an average of 40,000 tons a month. There were dire shortages of food, clothing, shoes, and other consumer goods and of industrial materials, automotive equipment, and agricultural machinery. The shelves were bare when we went into North Africa and remained so throughout our stay. Military needs for shipping and the general world shortage of supplies tell part of the story; but there is the additional fact that here, as later in France, we did not count upon any substantial industrial contribution from local sources and consequently had not planned on civilian imports beyond those necessary to maintain a minimum civilian economy essential to mili-

tary operations. Naturally, so negative an approach to the civilian economy, inevitable as it was, could scarcely be expected to evoke any great gratitude on the part of individual civilians; and it is understandable that our economic relations were conducted in an atmosphere of less than complete harmony. The situation was probably aggravated by our insistence, on supply grounds, that the few goods we delivered to North Africa (which the French were paying for in cash) should be distributed under our supervision. I think it is only fair to say, however, that the French Government in North Africa was not geared to deal adequately with the distribution of these supplies itself. Not only was it understaffed, but also, even within the limited staff, there was a great divergence of views, ranging from whole-hearted cooperation with the Allies to downright obstructionism on the part of a few collaborationists.

The net result was a considerable amount of confusion, some friction, and a rather uneven record in the full utilization of North Africa's limited resources in the war effort. Nevertheless, the major services essential to the Tunisian campaign and the preparations for the landings in Sicily, Italy, and metropolitan France were successfully mobilized and made available to the Allied military authorities. Operation of all the major ports was turned over entirely to American and British authorities, who operated them at such a high level of efficiency that they often exceeded by an almost incredible margin the pre-war rated unloading capacity. The railroads, telephone facilities, and power plants, operated by the French themselves, were likewise placed under Allied military priorities, which absorbed from 50 to 70 percent of all traffic. Other major industries were also substantially converted to military use, including (at estimated percentages) the cement plants (90 percent), cable plants (80 percent), and oxygen and welding plants (75 percent). In addition, innumerable small machine shops and almost all garages and warehouses were turned over for Allied military use. Furthermore, in all the major cities most of the hotels and larger stores and many of the big schools were requisitioned for billets and headquarters. In short, almost all the public facilities in the major urban areas were taken over by our military forces and the local population was left to shift for itself in a restricted

economy that scarcely surpassed the bare subsistence level.

Nevertheless, the North African operation must be called a success. As a vital link in our lines of communications, particularly for the Air Transport Command, and as a Mediterranean terminus for our sea lanes, North Africa more than lived up to expectations. Partly as a result of the sacrifices by the civilian population, our military forces were able to achieve a really outstanding record of efficiency in utilizing to the utmost North Africa's limited facilities.

### Metropolitan France After D Day

There was one tremendous economic and psychological difference between our landings in North Africa and our landings in France. France, unlike North Africa, had been occupied by enemy troops for many weary years. The people of France had thus been almost universally subjected to the hardships imposed by an army of occupation, with transport and other utilities substantially restricted to military use, and food and shelter subject to enemy requisition. Thus the impact of the Allied landings was less of a shock to France than it had been to North Africa. Furthermore, unlike the situation in North Africa, the landings in France opened the last phase of the war, and early deliverance from a hated and omnipresent enemy was a reasonable hope. Had it not been, therefore, for the terrible destruction caused by the fighting, and the displacement of expected civilian imports by the necessities of war, there would probably have been few major disappointments in our economic relations with France after D Day. The French understandingly and willingly went cold and hungry in the winter of 1944-45 in order that the war might be pressed quickly to a successful conclusion. They arranged without hesitation to provide the necessary port facilities, coal, transportation, public utilities, warehousing, quarters, and other immediate services which were available. They also undertook substantial programs for the production of supplies for our troops—including tires, cotton duck, uniforms, gasoline "jerri-cans," and assault boats for the Rhine crossing. Generally speaking, the services the French placed at our disposal for military purposes were limited only by physical ability.

Conversely, our engineers achieved outstanding performances in restoring damaged port, rail, and

communication facilities. The fact that these services were largely for military purposes, even though it be borne in mind that they were necessarily only a partial restoration in the face of tremendous and wide-spread devastation, does not detract from the fact that they were of substantial economic benefit to the French.

In general it can be said that on the one hand the French did what they could to devote their civilian economy to the war, and our military forces for their part did their utmost to restore damaged facilities for the combined use of the military and the civilian population. The chief difficulty from the beginning lay in shipping, which was totally inadequate to carry on both the European and the Pacific wars and still leave enough to provide for the liberated populations of western Europe. Port facilities and inland transport, badly damaged in the course of the invasions, were another major handicap. Despite our hopes for the prompt provisioning of liberated areas, the military found it possible to deliver to France during the entire year from D Day to May 31, 1945 only about 400,000 tons of food, clothing, medical supplies, and other civilian consumers' goods. Coal and petroleum accounted for another million tons of military imports for civilian use, but conversely the military consumed over a million tons of coal above what they could import. Any imports, of course, were of some help to the French economy; but the military authorities were unable to bring in more than a mere trickle of civilian goods through 1944, and they averaged only about 35,000 tons a month over the entire period of military supply—less than even North Africa had received and a minute fraction of what France normally imported before the war.

These military imports of civilian goods were, however, supplemented in 1945 by an increasing amount of purely civilian shipments. Ranging from 5 ships in January to 40 in June, an average of 20 ships a month was achieved for the 6 months—equivalent to approximately 150,000 tons a month, or nearly 1,000,000 tons for the first half year. Most of this tonnage, worth about \$150,000,000, went out under lend-lease.

Civilian imports into France were fast improving when the end of the Japanese war and the termination of lend-lease raised the difficult problem of financing additional shipments. The lend-lease program, based on the war's lasting well into 1946,

called for imports worth approximately \$2,500,000,000. At the termination of lend-lease about \$150,000,000 worth of civilian goods had been shipped (and was thus straight lend-lease goods), and more than \$250,000,000 had been contracted for and could thus go under the long-term credit of the 3 (c) clause of the lend-lease agreements. Of the balance, about \$450,000,000, although in requisition form, was not eligible for existing credit under the lend-lease agreement, and about \$1,700,000,000 (which was already being scaled down to a 1945 delivery program), had not even been requisitioned. The French were thus faced with the problem of arranging emergency financing to maintain the flow of vitally needed goods.

### Our Future Relations With France

The present financial position of France is not an uncommon one in business experience. Even the soundest of companies may lose most of its physical plant in a fire or other catastrophe and suddenly find itself in the position of having to meet its payroll, rebuild its plant, and set aside some working capital all at the same time. Even though the company has been foresighted enough to accumulate a small surplus, the available funds may not be sufficient for all these emergency needs. The company therefore seeks a loan to tide it over the crisis. If someone with capital has confidence in the company's ability to recover its earning power, it will get the loan.

There can be no doubt that the gold and foreign-exchange position of France has suffered less as a result of the war than has that of Great Britain, for instance. On the other hand, France entered the war with a comparatively weak economic position and has ended it with an even weaker one. It is difficult to estimate the loss of wealth suffered by France in the war, and it would be even more difficult to find an equitable basis on which to compare her loss with that of other nations. It is certain, however, that her present economic position is extremely weak, that she is badly in need of substantial dollar imports, and that, although she can spend some of her gold and foreign exchange, she cannot hope to make a start at national recovery without some help.

The tremendous economic importance of France to us and to the stability of the world's economy cannot be measured by the mere value of her pre-war imports and exports. Metropolitan France

imported from us only about \$150,000,000 worth of goods a year before the war and exported about \$50,000,000. The trade of other French territories was on an even smaller scale, North Africa, for example, importing in pre-war years about \$8,000,000 worth and exporting around \$6,000,000.

Due to the enormous demands of France for rehabilitation of her industry, however, our exports over the next few years will undoubtedly exceed by many times the pre-war level. Since any loans granted by our Government will be used to pay American firms for these exports, these loans will obviously be helpful in providing an outlet for the high productive capacity built up in the United States during the war. This Government financing of our exports cannot, however, go on indefinitely. It is essentially an emergency measure based on the assumption that the ultimate earning power of France will be restored to a point where she can not only repay the loan but also pay for the lesser but still substantial scale of imports which she will need after her emergency rehabilitation needs have been met. France is just as interested as we that any loan negotiated should be well within her ultimate ability to repay.

How long it will take France to reach and surpass her pre-war productive capacity depends on so many complex factors that it is idle to guess. Given prosperity here, however, there would seem to be no limit to our capacity to absorb luxury goods, which are France's export specialty. It is certainly safe to predict that, if the proposed international economic programs are successfully launched, France, along with other nations, will be able to increase her exports very substantially over pre-war quantities. Moreover, the return of her normal tourist trade, possibly greatly increased through post-war travel, would provide an important dollar income. If France can adjust her economy to the demands of modern competition, her financial future need not be dark.

In her efforts to regain economic health, one of the important questions which France must decide is whether she should endeavor to maintain a large army. It takes no exhaustive study to understand why France, invaded time and again across her eastern border and supported by her Allies invariably too late to protect her from invasion, has good historical reasons for feeling that she needs an unusually big army. This feeling is no doubt enhanced by the obvious desire of the

United States to maintain minimum occupation forces in Germany no longer than necessary. On the other hand, the French press has recently brought to light a substantial difference of opinion on whether, in view of her present position *vis-à-vis* the vast military strength of some of her sister nations, France would be well advised to sacrifice further her civilian economy in order to build up a great army.

Essentially, the leadership that France can still best provide is political, scientific, and cultural. Our own close ties with France have always been based on these intellectual attributes rather than on her military or economic strength. Ideologically, the democracy of France has been especially close to ours in both form and substance. Scientifically, she has given the world new concepts which, frequently carried to practical success in our own laboratories, have revolutionized our way of living. Culturally, she enjoys in the aggregate of her music, art, philosophy, and literature perhaps a more loved and respected position than that of any other nation.

These are the things for which France stands, today as always, and these are the things on which she may again concentrate her efforts, for her benefit and the benefit of the world. A sound economy for France, in which these qualities can flourish, deserves our hopes and our thoughtful support.

Pan-American Coffee Conference recently held in Mexico City.

Replying, in behalf of the other government authorities as well, Mr. Acheson made it quite clear that the State Department felt it proper that the question of ceiling prices, like other international matters concerning coffee, should be considered by the United States Government through the Inter-American Coffee Board or directly with the countries signatory to the Inter-American Coffee Agreement. The text of Mr. Acheson's letter follows:

**MY DEAR MR. PENTEADO:**

This is in reply to the telegrams dated September 11 received from the Chairman of the Fourth Pan American Coffee Conference and submitting for consideration to the Office of Price Administration, this Department and various other agencies of the United States Government a resolution regarding emergency controls on coffee adopted by the delegates to the Fourth Pan American Coffee Conference recently held in Mexico City under the auspices of the Pan American Coffee Bureau. The telegram of September 13 on the same subject addressed to the President by the Chairman of the Conference has been referred to the Department of State for reply and is also hereby acknowledged.

As you know, the Inter-American Coffee Board was duly constituted by inter-governmental action to centralize consideration of coffee matters of interest to the countries signatory to the Inter-American Coffee Agreement. On this Board, the Governments of the producing countries and the United States have representation. This Department feels it is proper for the United States Government to consider matters relating to emergency controls on coffee through the good offices of the Inter-American Coffee Board and, if necessary, directly with the governments signatory to the Agreement. You are assured that through these channels the coffee situation will continue to be explored with the greatest possible sympathy and attention.

I understand that the Board has asked its United States member to discuss the coffee situation with this Department.

Sincerely yours,

**DEAN ACHESON**  
*Acting Secretary*

## Consideration of Emergency Controls on Coffee

[Released to the press October 1]

On October 1, in a letter from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Eurico Penteado, Chairman of the Pan-American Coffee Bureau, the State Department indicated the channels through which questions of international concern relating to coffee would be considered by this Government.

A number of communications urging elimination, suspension, or modification of the coffee price ceilings now in effect have recently been addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Price Administrator, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce, and the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion from the Fourth

# St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project

## MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press by the White House October 3]

*To the Congress of the United States:*

As a part of our program of international cooperation, expanding foreign trade, and domestic progress in commerce and industry, I recommend the speedy approval by the Congress of the agreement of March 19, 1941 between the United States and Canada for the development of the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Basin. When approved, the two countries will be able to harness for the public benefit one of the greatest natural resources of North America, opening the Great Lakes to ocean navigation and creating 2,200,000 horsepower of hydroelectric capacity to be divided equally between the people of the United States and Canada.

The development, utilization, and conservation of our natural resources are among those fields of endeavor where the Government's responsibility has been well recognized for many generations.

During the war we were forced to suspend many of the projects designed to harness the waters of our great rivers for the promotion of commerce and industry and for the production of cheap electric power. We must now resume these projects and embark upon others.

The Congress and the people of our country can take just pride and satisfaction in the foresight they showed by developing the Tennessee and Columbia Rivers and the rivers in the Central Valley of California. Without the power from these rivers the goal of 50,000 airplanes a year—considered fantastic only five short years ago, but actually surpassed twice over—would have been impossible. Nor could we have developed the atomic bomb as early as we did without the large blocks of power we used from the Tennessee and Columbia Rivers.

The timely development of these rivers shortened the war by many years and saved countless American lives. We must ever be grateful for the vision of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the wisdom of the Congress in urging and approving the harnessing of these priceless natural resources.

One of the great constructive projects of the North American continent, in fact, one of the great projects of the world, which was delayed by the exigencies of war, is the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.

For 50 years the United States and Canada under both Republican and Democratic administrations, under Liberal and Conservative governments, have envisioned the development of the project together, as a joint enterprise.

Upon the expectation that we would join with them in completing this great engineering project, Canada has already built more than half its share of the undertaking.

We, however, still have our major contribution to make.

Every engineering investigation during the past 50 years, every economic study in the past 25 years has found the project feasible and economically desirable. The case has been proved; the plans are ready.

The St. Lawrence Seaway will make it possible to utilize our war-expanded factories and shipping facilities in the development of international economic cooperation and enlarging world commerce. New and increasing opportunities for production and employment by private enterprise can be expected from this cheap water transportation.

It is the kind of useful construction which will furnish lucrative employment to many thousands of our people.

The completion of the Seaway will bring many benefits to our great neighbor and Ally on the north. The experience of two wars and of many years of peace has shown beyond question that the prosperity and defense of Canada and of the United States are closely linked together.

By development of our natural water-power resources, we can look forward with certainty to greater use of electricity in the home, in the fac-

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Senate and the House of Representatives on Oct. 3, 1945.

tory, and on the farm. The national average annual consumption of electricity by domestic consumers has almost doubled in the past 10 years. Even with that increase, the national average is only 65 percent as high as in the Tennessee Valley, where electric rates are lower. Increase in the consumption of electricity will mean more comforts on the farms and in city homes. It will mean more jobs, more income, and a higher standard of living. We are only on the threshold of an era of electrified homes and mechanical aids to better living. We can encourage this trend by using the bounty of nature in the water power of our rivers.

If we develop the water power of the St. Lawrence River, the United States share of that power will be available for distribution within a radius of 300 miles. This will include most of New York State and its neighbor States to the east. Public and private agencies will be able to pass on to the consumers in that area all the advantages of this cheap power.

Under the leadership of Governor and later President Roosevelt, the State of New York created the framework of a state power program. I have always been, and still am, in favor of that program.

Under it, the power facilities are to be constructed by the Federal Government and turned

over by it to the State of New York. The terms of allocation of costs to the State of New York have been agreed upon in a memorandum of agreement dated February 7, 1933, recommended for execution by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Power Authority of the State of New York. This basis of allocation is fair and acceptable.

It has always been understood by the responsible proponents of this development that the water-power project should become the property of the State of New York, and that the electric power should be developed and handled by the State. That should continue to be the policy, and I recommend that it be so declared by the Congress.

Any agreement with the State of New York to this end must protect the interests of the United States as well as the interests of neighboring states, and will, of course, have to be submitted for approval by the Congress before it can become effective.

I urge upon the Congress speedy enactment of legislation to accomplish these objectives so that work may start on this great undertaking at the earliest possible time.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

October 3, 1945

#### STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press October 4]

The Department of State welcomes the introduction of legislation to approve the agreement with Canada covering the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. The Department is now, and always has been, strongly in favor of the approval of this agreement. While the project will be of great immediate benefit to the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence area, we are convinced that it will bring long-range benefits to the country as a whole.

The St. Lawrence Seaway will give the great and productive midlands of this continent direct access to the sealanes of the world. The rapids of the St. Lawrence have always constituted a natural barrier to our foreign trade. At a time when we are making every effort to clear the channels of world commerce as a step toward world peace, we should remove this natural barrier. So also

we should take advantage of this great natural resource by harnessing the International Rapids of the St. Lawrence River for power purposes.

For well over a century the United States and Canada have worked together in peace and partnership. One of the few pending matters between the two countries is the approval of the 1941 agreement with Canada providing for the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. Canada has already expended substantial sums in constructing works related to this project. The approval of the agreement and the completion of the project will strengthen our traditionally friendly ties with Canada. It will considerably broaden the basis for mutually profitable trade between ourselves and our good neighbor.

# Displaced Populations in Japan at the End of the War

BY JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY<sup>1</sup>

**E**VEN BEFORE THE FINAL ENTRY of the American forces into Japan, word was sent to General MacArthur by the Japanese Government that Koreans anxious to get back to Korea from Japan were pouring in great numbers into Shimonoseki, located on the island of Honshu, and its vicinity, only 120 miles across from Korea, while Fusan in Korea was crowded with home-bound Japanese, including women and children. Both places were "faced by scarcity of food and difficulty in the maintenance of law and order." In these circumstances, the Japanese Government requested permission to operate two unarmed vessels as ferries between Fusan and Hakata. General MacArthur granted the request immediately.

This was the first time any word of displaced persons had come through officially during the years of war with Japan. During the war through various means—chiefly through broadcasts<sup>2</sup>—knowledge had seeped through about the displaced in both Japan and the Japanese Empire.<sup>3</sup>

The total number of uprooted and displaced people in Japan today, including all nationalities, probably runs over 12 million. Included in this number are probably some 2 million Korean laborers and their families, an unknown number of Chinese workers, some 38 thousand Formosan-Chinese laborers, and perhaps many displaced Japanese nationals returning from Formosa, China, Manchuria, and the Japanese Mandated Islands before the end of the war.

In Germany one of the most important categories of displaced population was that of forced labor. By contrast, Japan, for all its manpower shortage, never imported quite such large armies of men, largely because of bottlenecks in transportation and food production. Japan repeatedly announced the decentralization of its industry and

the removal of factories to Manchuria, although some were sent to China where manpower and materials were used at their sources. Reports came through in the spring of 1945 that a number of Japanese were being sent outside the country from their homes in bombed Japanese areas, going particularly to Manchuria, to be used in food and industrial production. The number of these was not great, due largely to lack of transportation facilities.

The Koreans form the largest group among the foreign displaced in Japan. Higher living standards in Japan than Korea have always brought about some regular immigration of Koreans into Japan, but Japanese manpower needs in the war caused greatly increased immigration of Korean labor and simultaneously curtailed the return of Korean laborers from Japan to Korea. Opportunities for employment overcame the traditional dislike of the Koreans for the Japanese and made many cross the straits by small boat to enter Japan surreptitiously. As the war progressed the ever-growing need for labor in Japan prompted the importation of Koreans by force, and they have been imported at the rate of about 10,000 a month. By September 1944 a Japanese broadcast stated there were one million several hundred thousand Koreans in Japan, but only three months later another broadcast gave the number as three million.

A statement of the Welfare Ministry to the Diet on September 5, 1945, indicated that the

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Carey is Assistant Adviser on Displaced Populations in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> The Daily Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission, have been source material for quotations from and references to radio broadcasts.

<sup>3</sup> The present article discusses only the displaced in Japan proper, not the Empire.

number of workers imported en masse from Korea was 323,890. This number presumably refers to forced laborers taken in large groups to factories and mines during the course of the war and does not include the large numbers of Koreans who entered Japan before the war or those coming individually or in small groups. A Domei broadcast the same day gave the total number of Koreans in Japan as 2,400,000, and the next day gave the number as 2,100,000 and stated that over 300,000 of these had been drafted into war industries. The same broadcast told of the fact that Korean laborers desiring repatriation to Korea would be given priority on the ferries for the return trip to Korea but that, owing to the scarcity of transportation, only 30,000 persons would be transported each month. Actually, 4,000 persons were reportedly sent daily during the first week of operation. By September 13 four more ships were added to the run, primarily because of the rush of Japanese women and children back to Japan from Korea and Manchuria.

The Koreans in Japan have been primarily laborers, chiefly in the mines; thus the war has increased the number of miners greatly. In July 1942 German sources said that 18.4 percent of all laborers in the mines were Koreans, but two years later a Japanese broadcast indicated that 200,000 or 30 percent of all coal miners were Koreans. By 1945, according to Chinese sources, Korean men under 20 and over 30 were being sent as forced laborers to mines and factories in Japan. The mines were reported to have been surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements and machine guns mounted on all entrances to prevent an uprising or flight from work. In 1944 more than 10,000 Koreans were reported to have been sent as forced agricultural laborers to Japanese rural villages. Gradually some of the Koreans in Japan have been trained in semi-skilled work in factories, particularly in the machine, chemical, and fiber industries.

Many of the Korean laborers went to Japan on one- or two-year contracts but manpower shortages caused the Japanese Government to try to keep the Koreans in Japan by extension of contracts. Despite the fact that the Koreans were not well treated in the past and occupied virtually the lowest economic status of the whole population, recently efforts have been made to mollify this group. The Peoples' Labor Conscription Ordinance of February 8, 1944 conscripted Koreans

and allowed them to take their families with them to Japan. By the latter part of 1944 Japan promised complete non-discrimination for the Koreans in education and work, just as the Germans in the latter part of the war attempted to pacify the forced laborers from Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by promising removal of discrimination. Just as the Germans gave medals and other tokens of recognition to their forced laborers, so the Japanese began to offer gold medals and allowances to Korean workers.

The Koreans are scattered throughout Japan, but they have been concentrated in the cities, particularly Osaka, Kyoto, Fukuoka, and Tokyo. The more recently transplanted workers were sent to the same cities, and to Hiroshima, Hokuriku, and Tohoku areas, and in general were distributed throughout the Shikoku and Kyushu Islands and Hokkaido.

There have been separate Korean districts in Japanese cities—usually the poorest sections of the cities. There has been almost no intermarriage or assimilation with the Japanese, and few Koreans speak Japanese.

Despite the propaganda attempts of the Japanese, the Formosan-Chinese, like the Koreans, were anti-Japanese in feeling and sentiment. There were only some 10,000 Formosan-Chinese in Japan in 1940, and four years later perhaps as many as 40,000 were taken north from Formosa to work in Japanese war industries and mines. Many of these may be regarded as forced laborers.

Even before the Meiji restoration and the official opening of Japan to foreign commerce, Chinese had been allowed to enter Japan from China. By 1930 there were possibly some 27,000 Chinese in Japan, including merchants and students but primarily laborers. Hostilities between China and Japan meant the return to China of many Chinese who had formerly lived in Japan, so that by 1942, according to Chinese sources, there were only some 15,000 left in Japan.

On April 4, 1942 the *Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitung* reported that Chinese workers were being sent for employment in Japanese war industry and that these workers were also being transferred from Shanghai to industrial areas of North China. Another report in 1943 indicated that more than 100,000 Chinese had been impressed by the Japanese for use on farms to work in groups of two or three and that some of these had gone to Japan

although Japanese sources the following year indicated that there were 225,000 Chinese laborers in Japan. In March of that year it was reported that 10,000 able-bodied young Chinese were being gathered in Lienyun Harbor in Kiangsu Province ready to be sent to Japan as laborers.

A Japanese broadcast announced in February 1944 that the "experiment" conducted in 1943 with Chinese laborers had had "satisfactory results" so plans were announced at that time to import "a large number" in the future.

The number of Chinese in Japan at the time of surrender was a riddle, but it is probable that 100,000 is an exaggeration since manpower needs of the Japanese in China and Manchuria were so great and transportation so difficult that perhaps only a part of this number, including both laborers in war industries and students, were actually in Japan.

The Domei broadcast of September 5 said that 34,000 Chinese had been imported en masse from China. Presumably these were forced laborers like the Koreans and were the numbers imported for war industries.

Aside from the large numbers of Koreans and Formosan-Chinese and the Chinese, few foreign groups were left in Japan at the time the great bombings began. There were 2,459 persons from Manchuria, either workers or students, who were part of the large number of students sent to Japan from "Greater East Asia" for indoctrination in Japanese ways and thinking.

By September 1944 a question had arisen in the Diet regarding what to do with foreign students in Japan because the schools were closed due to the year-round mobilization of students. A report in March 1945 stated that, within the next month, measures would be taken to accommodate all "overseas students who have been idle during the past year owing to the temporary closing down of some of the higher institutions of learning to allow Japanese students to serve in factories and farms." It was also reported that several colleges and universities would remain open for the G. E. A. students, numbering several hundred, of which the largest number were Chinese from Manchuria. Students from the southern countries, almost all of whom attended Kokusai Gakuyu Kai, were to enter universities in the southern part of Japan, ostensibly because of the warmer climate, while those from Manchu-

ria and China "being accustomed to cold winters" were to study in the central or northern districts.

There have been some 975 Indians in Japan, including both students and revolutionaries. Japan had long been a seat of anti-British Indian activity. There have been some 1,300 of the great group of White Russians found in every country after the Russian Revolution. A few neutrals, largely diplomatic or businessmen, included about 250 Swiss and Portuguese each and somewhat more than 100 Spaniards. The small German colony had been increased in 1941 by the evacuation to Japan of German women and children from the Netherlands East Indies and was probably still further increased by later evacuation of Germans from the Philippines which may bring the number of Germans to 2,000.

As of the spring of 1945, some 30,000 to 40,000 prisoners of war and 500 to 600 civilian internees were located in Japan itself, including 7,000 American prisoners of war, 5,000 Netherlands, 5,000 to 8,000 Australians, 1,000 Canadians from Hong Kong, and 14,000 British. The American and British civilians were generally held in camps or prisons, though some were allowed to go free or were interned at home. The civilians included approximately 200 American technicians from Guam.

Increased bombing of Japan, with its small area and heavy industrial concentration, led to vast internal displacement of the Japanese population. Internal displacement occurs when persons flee as war fugitives or when people have been moved within their own countries because of evacuation from bombed areas or zones of military operations or because of movement of war industries with a consequent need of manpower in the new location.

In Japan the shortage of food also led to relocation of bombed-out persons in accordance with their possible usefulness in food production. In Germany more than 20 million people were reported to have been made homeless or forced into temporary shelters away from home by the steady pressure of bombing, and in Japan probably half that number were displaced within a smaller area. According to a Tokyo broadcast of August 23, 1945 some 9,200,000 persons in Japan were left homeless or were made war fugitives by Allied air blows on the Japanese home islands. Two hundred sixty thousand had been killed

## JAPAN



and 412,000 injured. These figures include 90,000 killed and 180,000 wounded by the two atomic bombs.

The chief island to be affected was Honshu, with the Prefectures of Akita and Yamagata in the far north, Ishikawa, Tottori, and Shimane on the coast of the Sea of Japan, and Kyoto, Nara, Shiga, and Nagano in middle Honshu. The northern

island of Hokkaido received little bombing except for the ports of Hakodate and Muroran.

An industrial decentralization program had been under way in Japan since 1938. Under an order of October 16, 1939 the Ministry of War was given authority to determine the number and location of new factories and could refuse to permit further construction in what were then deemed

potential target areas. Even by May 1945 Domei declared that factory decentralization comprised the largest part of the depopulation of cities.

During all of the period of heavy bombing before the end of the war, plans for evacuation and dispersal of the population poured over the Japanese radio in such a steady stream that it became impossible to tell what was plan and what was accomplishment. The evacuation movement actually got under way slowly, because the family system of Japan necessarily caused resistance to the breaking up of family units and the uprooting of long-established homes. On the other hand, the fact that many Japanese city-dwellers had relatives in the country meant that ready means of absorption of the displaced was at hand. In all plans for evacuation persons displaced from the cities were to go to their relatives in the country if possible and only if there were no relatives in rural areas were groups to be evacuated and kept together. On March 15, 1945 a Domei report stated that the Government at one time considered the possibility of a compulsory allocation of refugee areas and housing for evacuees from air raids but, because some of the victims "went to stay with relatives and some with friends", the result was that "the majority of them have been relocated as if they had been swallowed up in the great current of friendly spirit and the traditional family system." Therefore, the broadcast continued, there was practically no necessity for a compulsory allocation of dwellings.

A further aspect of Japanese life affected the plans for dispersal. The light construction of many houses meant that frequently houses if not factories were moved along with the people. Nevertheless housing shortages were serious throughout the country. The Tokyo broadcast of August 23, 1945, in telling of the 9,200,000 persons left homeless as a result of bombing, also indicated that 2,210,000 homes in Japan were demolished or burned and 90,000 others damaged.

From the summer of 1944 on, strenuous attempts were made to persuade parents to allow children from the third to tenth grades to be removed from cities where particular bombing danger existed and be sent to relatives in the country if possible. If no such relatives could be found, school groups were to be sent together. These latter were to be housed in large private homes, hotels, and old temples. The teachers were to go too, to live with the children and carry on their

teaching. The Japanese family system, together with transportation problems, caused particular difficulties with children slated for group evacuation. Nevertheless, the bombing situation finally became so serious and so many children were sent away from Tokyo that, when the Americans entered the city in August, they noticed the almost complete dearth of children.

All schools in the country were finally closed entirely in the fall of 1944, and all available children old enough to be of any possible use were put to work in agricultural and industrial production. After the end of the war, the Japanese Education Ministry ordered the reopening of all schools and colleges by September 15, 1945. This order, according to Domei, "will return to school nearly 10,000,000 Japanese boys and girls mobilized for war service", though later Japanese figures indicated that there were 1,927,370 mobilized students including those engaged in agriculture and forestry. The discrepancy is possibly due to the inclusion in the first large figure of part-time students and very young children.

In Germany children under 12, nursing mothers, women over 60, some men over 65 years of age, and those unfit for military service were moved from the danger zone east of the Oder River in the face of the Soviet advance; in Japan not only children but also expectant mothers and old people were part of the plan for those first to be sent away from Japanese cities in danger of bombing. During the fall and winter of 1944-45 attempts were made to get the movement started, but up to mid-March of 1945 evacuation of pregnant women, of women with small children, and of the elderly proceeded very slowly. The incendiary bombings of that period tightened the resolve of the Cabinet to go full steam ahead with its plans and to insist that only persons essential to the war were to remain in such cities as were apt to be heavily bombed. Persons essential to the war included persons connected with the production of munitions and food, doctors, employees of public utilities and banks. Even the wives and children of these men were to be evacuated. Tokyo mothers with small children were to be sent to Niigata Prefecture if they had no country relatives to care for them. Each group of 50 expectant mothers was to have midwives, baby specialists, dietitians, and washerwomen assigned to it. The homes of what were called "evacuation widowers"

whose families had been sent to the country were to be looked after by the Neighborhood Associations.

As early as February 1944 plans were under way for wide-spread evacuation of the population from certain areas especially apt to be bombed—Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, and Moji—but the fall of that year arrived before much if any evacuation actually took place, and it was not before May 5, 1945 that evacuation actually began to be effective. It was decided that by June the people from the Tokyo-Yokohama (Keihin) area were to be sent to Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, and Shinetsu; persons from the Osaka-Kobe area were to be sent to the Kinki-Chugoku and Tokai-Hokuriku areas especially for farm work. Those unable to do heavy farm labor, especially women, were to be put in charge of cooking, child care, and serving.

Tokyo had special plans for evacuation. From March 1944 plans were under way to evacuate at least 2 million Tokyo residents, first to outlying districts and especially to farming villages where they could work at the mounting problem of food raising. By fall a Diet interpellation indicated that over a million persons had left the city out of a population of 6,500,000, and by March of 1945 further Diet statements gave the population of the city as less than 4 million though it is doubtful whether it was possible to have arranged for the removal of so many by that time. Nevertheless it was reported that so many people had left Tokyo by the early part of January 1945 that rooms and houses were reportedly being offered rent free. Some house owners had offered a monthly stipend to any person who would live on their property.

After the end of the war, Domei reported that on May 31, after the largest-scale air raid on Tokyo, there were 2,400,000 people left in the city. Of these about 10 percent, or 204,000, were reported to live in provisional shacks in devastated areas. Although approximately 60 percent of the pre-war Tokyo population had left the city, houses were said to have decreased by more than 70 percent. From January on, the Government had decided that vacant houses were to be occupied by those whose houses had been demolished by air raids. Houses that might prove difficult to care for were to be dismantled and moved. Yamagata Prefecture, in the mountains north of Tokyo, was overrun by an influx of refugees from Tokyo. The

situation became so serious that prefectoral government authorities had to make the arrangements for renting houses.

The Tokyo municipality arranged to aid air-raid victims who had no place to go by providing living accommodations and employment in the Prefectures of Akita, Yamagata, and Fukushima. For a period after air raids transportation was provided free.

By the spring of 1945 fear of bombing and of possible invasion had become so great that people began to flee from their homes in a haphazard and unplanned way, and, according to a Domei broadcast of May 7, 1945, even people in small towns had caught the evacuation scare. It was stated in the Diet that Yokohama had had "gratifying results" in checking the flight of people who were in essential occupations and so required to remain at home. By June it was announced over the radio that persons would not be evacuated from the coasts or from medium- and small-sized communities except under certain circumstances and must stay where they were, doubtless because there was nowhere to go.

Before the end of the war, word percolated through that people evacuated from Okinawa in the face of the American invasion were in various places on the Island of Kyushu raising food crops while, by July 1945, 200 Okinawa boys were reported to be working in Tokyo airplane factories.

An emergency housing measure provided for the construction of living quarters in medium- and small-sized cities throughout the country to be rented to air-raid victims. The first work was to provide housing for those who had to remain in the six cities of Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe, but who had lost their homes by bombing. In Tokyo the first batch of housing areas to be built was to be put up along government-operated railway lines. The construction of wartime housing areas for those evacuated from war-ravaged localities, together with allotment of land for home gardens and jointly managed gardens, was to be carried out in Keihin, Hanshin, Nagoya, and northern Kyushu.

Government policy in the war was to use as much evacuee manpower as possible in increased food production. Even before the war, the Japanese Government had attempted to promote a back-to-the-farm movement because of the increasing concentration of population in the cities, but the war

with its attendant shortages of farm manpower and of foodstuffs caused stronger pressure to be exerted on city dwellers to persuade them to go to work on farms in the country. By the spring of 1945 all possible pressure was being used. At the end of March the cabinet passed a strong return-to-the-farm measure, and by summer Japanese broadcasts stated that some 100,000 families out of a proposed 400,000 had been sent to the country for farm work under this scheme, though the number may have been exaggerated. Separate preliminary arrangements were made in each prefecture for the reception of the people. Evacuees sent to the country were to be provided with farm plots by each of the agricultural communities to which they were sent if they did not already own property there.

According to a plan drawn up by the Agriculture, Commerce, and Home Ministries and announced June 7, 1945, city evacuees and air-raid victims were to be sent to the northern island of Hokkaido en masse for agricultural work. As an initial measure approximately 50,000 families, or 200,000 evacuees, were to be sent there in the summer of 1945. Lodging in the Hokkaido colonial training centers, schools, temples, and homes of others was to be provided, all expenses paid, and when simple living quarters were built rent was to be free. Temporarily crops raised on the one *chobu* (2.45 acres) of land were to be kept and used by the family. Food was provided at the beginning, if necessary, plus an allowance if need was great.

Applications were opened on June 15-July 15 for the 50,000 families planned for Hokkaido. The first contingent of 1,100 members, called the Northern Area Development Farmer-Soldier Corps, left Tokyo by special train on July 6, and a second contingent of 274 families, consisting of 1,031 members, left soon afterwards and arrived in Hakodate three days later.

Immediately after the end of the war, Domei announced that the Japanese Home Ministry would continue its policy of evacuating the residents of the big cities and, at the same time, of preventing the return home of city inhabitants who had been evacuated to the country. The continuation of this plan was doubtless due to continued shortage of foodstuffs and the need for continued emphasis on their production together with the shortage of housing in the cities.

Beginning September 10 anyone wanting to leave the city to return to his native place in the country was to be allowed to go without restriction, but anyone wanting to return to the city was to be prohibited "for sometime to come", according to the Chief of the National Public Works Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs. He also stated that eventually 10 million people will probably return to the six big cities, but they will be allowed to return only gradually and under a planned arrangement for population distribution.

A Deliberative Council was set up in every prefecture to receive evacuees. Headed by the governor and composed of men connected with transportation, food supply, housing, and electrical distribution, the council was to decide on just what was to be done with resettling and rehabilitating evacuees.

In the death-throes of German dissolution, a *Volkssturm* was established to mobilize old and young in a last desperate attempt to stand against the flood-tide of Allied invasion. So in its last-ditch stand and fear of imminent Allied invasion Japan established a volunteer combat organization within the general framework of the previously existing Civilian Volunteer Corps. All males from 15-60 and women of 17-40 except those considered "the nucleus of the home" were to be recruited under penalty of fine and imprisonment for combat service if military necessity dictated. The new corps was to have military status and to be under the direct command of the Emperor, and the command of each unit was to be an honored position based on Imperial authority. The basic principle on which the corps was to operate was that "the Imperial land, the resting place of gods, the native home, and working place of the people" must be defended at all costs. The principal duty of the members was to participate in combat and support military activities in production, transportation, et cetera. Each factory, government office, and group of students was to have its own group of from 10-30 members and to work together in one locality.

The principal duty of the members was to be ready to participate in combat in case of invasion. On the other hand, there had been no training or equipment for civilians to be used as fighters, so it appears that the corps was really planned to be used as a means of developing labor mobilization and production rather than as a Japanese brand of

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the German *Volkssturm*. Its duties as first outlined consisted of those bearing on military operations but not directly connected with them, such as transportation and commissary work. Other members of the corps were to be assigned to factory and farm work under military discipline.

The first such corps to be formed was a Railway Civilian Combat Corps, doubtless because of the bottleneck in transportation and the need for military discipline among the railway workers.

On the evening of September 3, 1945 some 2,700 Japanese who had been living in Korea, Manchuria, and China reached the port of Hakata in northern Kyushu. This group was but a tiny fraction of the 4 million Japanese living outside Japan, many of whom will want to, or be forced to return to Japan. The problems of resettlement of this group, variously estimated at 1,500,000-3,000,000, in a Japan devastated by bombs and short of food, will prove one of the most important of the difficulties facing the occupying authorities in Japan, as well as in the long-range economic and social rehabilitation of the country.

## Discussions With Mexico on Air-Transport Agreement

[Released to the press October 2]

Discussions regarding a bilateral air-transport agreement between the United States and Mexico will take place in Washington during the next few days, the Department of State announced on October 2. The proposed agreement will govern the operation of commercial air services between the two countries.

The negotiations on behalf of Mexico will be carried on by Rafael de la Colina, Chargé d'Affaires of the Mexican Embassy in Washington; Gen. Alberto Salinas Carranza, of the Mexican Air Force; Rebolledo Clement and Hernandez Llergo, of the Mexican Ministry of Communications and Public Works.

The United States will be represented by L. Welch Pogue, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board; Oswald Ryan, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board; Stokeley W. Morgan, Chief of the Aviation Division, Department of State; and John W. Carrigan, Chief of the Division of Mexican Affairs, Department of State.

## Regarding Philippine Independence

### Statement by THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House October 3]

As you know, President Osmeña of the Philippines is in Washington. On Monday, I conferred with him and with the High Commissioner to the Philippines, Mr. McNutt, and the Acting Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Fortas. I propose to confer again with President Osmeña and to formulate a broad program for this Government with respect to the Philippines. This program will, of course, reflect the traditional friendship of the people of the United States and of the Philippines, and it will take account of the heroic and loyal conduct of the Filipinos during the war. In preparation for my further conferences with President Osmeña, I have asked Mr. McNutt and Mr. Fortas to consult with the President of the Philippines with respect to all matters of mutual interest.

At the moment, I want to clarify the question of the date upon which Philippine independence may be expected. Under the statutes now in force, independence is scheduled for July 4, 1946, or sooner if the President of the United States shall so proclaim. There has been wide speculation as to whether a date prior to July 4, 1946, will be fixed. This speculation has introduced a high degree of uncertainty at a very critical time in Philippine affairs, and has resulted in some confusion in the programs of both the Commonwealth Government and United States agencies.

It would be neither just nor fair to the loyal people of the Philippines, who have been our brothers in war as well as in peace, to proclaim their independence until the necessary program for rehabilitation has been worked out and until there has been a determination of the fundamental problems involved in our mutual relationship after independence. Additional time is also required to enable the Philippine Government to set its own house in order and to hold a free democratic election.

To assist in the orderly working out of these problems, I am taking this opportunity to state that I do not intend to consider advancing the proclamation of Philippine independence to a date earlier than July 4, 1946 until the necessary measures which I have outlined have been taken.

# Our Occupation Policy for Japan

## PARTICIPANTS

**JOHN CARTER VINCENT**

Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs,  
Department of State, and Chairman,  
Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War,  
Navy Coordinating Committee

**Maj. Gen. JOHN H. HILDRING**

Director of Civil Affairs, War Department

**Capt. R. L. DENNISON**

U.S. Navy, Representative of the Navy  
Department on the Far Eastern Sub-  
committee, State, War, Navy Coordin-  
ating Committee

**STERLING FISHER**

Director, NBC University of the Air

[Released to the press October 6]

**ANNOUNCER:** Here are *headlines from Washington:*

General Hildring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken Up; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines; Promises Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military Fanatics.

John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto; Says That the Institution of the Emperor Will Have To Be Radically Modified, and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free Assembly and Free Discussion.

Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil Aviation; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan.

**ANNOUNCER:** This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Government officials and members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the

Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan". Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hildring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U.S.N., Navy Department representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. Mr. Fisher—

**FISHER:** No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much of the confusion surrounding this debate.<sup>1</sup> But it also raised many questions—questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to interpret further our Japan policy.

General Hildring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that policy is determined.

**HILDRING:** Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will try to explain how it *is* made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee—"SWINC", we call it—formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the approved policies are then drawn

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 23, 1945, p. 423.

up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we think he is doing it very well.

**FISHER:** Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chairman does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.

**VINCENT:** That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with which General Hilldring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and I sit in an advisory capacity.

**HILLDRING:** The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.

**FISHER:** Mr. Vincent, I'd like to know whether there is a—shall we say—strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.

**VINCENT:** No, there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.

**FISHER:** There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian advisers.

**VINCENT:** That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to send more and more such people out.

**FISHER:** As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee, Captain Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and voice in, the policy for Japan.

**DENNISON:** We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000 vessels of the United

States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played in the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always present a naval problem.

**FISHER:** What part is the Navy playing now in that control?

**DENNISON:** Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil-affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.

**FISHER:** Does that include Okinawa?

**DENNISON:** Yes.

**FISHER:** That's not generally known, is it?

**DENNISON:** No, I believe not. I'd like to add—besides these immediate duties the United States Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan long after our troops are withdrawn.

**FISHER:** Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcommittee which drafts our occupation policy, can you give us a statement of our over-all objectives?

**VINCENT:** Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize Japan—to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

**FISHER:** And how long do you think that will take?

**VINCENT:** The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic tendencies.

**FISHER:** General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?

**HILLDRING:** To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clairvoyance I

don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish our aims. We *must* stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.

**FISHER:** To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy?

**HILLDRING:** That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.

**FISHER:** Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?

**VINCENT:** Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies for the control of Japan.<sup>1</sup> In addition to the four principal powers in the Far East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the Commission.

**FISHER:** Coming back to our first objective—General Hilldring, what about the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?

**HILLDRING:** Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.

**FISHER:** And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?

**HILLDRING:** It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated; the return of Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.

**FISHER:** Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the Japanese forces scattered through Asia?

**DENNISON:** It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to three million

Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.

**FISHER:** And what is being done with the Japanese Navy?

**DENNISON:** The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed.

**FISHER:** Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military system—the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecuting liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be done about that?

**VINCENT:** That vicious system will be abolished, Mr. Fisher. Not only the top chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have to be substituted for it.

**DENNISON:** We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and not an army in the guise of police.

**HILLDRING:** As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already abolished the Kempai and political police.

**FISHER:** It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government, from the Emperor on down.

**VINCENT:** Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the people of Japan must be removed.

**FISHER:** Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?

**VINCENT:** The institution of the Emperor—if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it—will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher.

**DENNISON:** The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.

**FISHER:** Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point, Captain Dennison?

**DENNISON:** I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur said:

<sup>1</sup> See p. 545.

"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force."<sup>1</sup> That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

FISHER: That's clear enough. . . . Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference between them?

HILLDRING: Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Reduced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Government, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.

FISHER: Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of the national Government in Japan?

HILLDRING: The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their

own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.

FISHER: But some people argue, General, that by utilizing the Japanese Government we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?

HILLDRING: Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japanese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.

DENNISON: Our policy is to *use* the existing form of government in Japan, not to *support* it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to feel out the situation.

FISHER: Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?

DENNISON: In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has correspondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.

FISHER: He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me.

VINCENT: Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out.

FISHER: Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war criminals?

VINCENT: We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection.

HILLDRING: We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is applying in Germany are being used in Japan.

DENNISON: Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they are punished—not to

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480.

talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.

FISHER: All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu—the big industrialists—who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, among the guilty?

DENNISON: We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

FISHER: General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?

HILDRING: Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos—militarists—will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines *must* be broken up. There's no other way to accomplish it.

FISHER: What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT: Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

FISHER: And the financial combines as well?

VINCENT: Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

FISHER: Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu". Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

DENNISON: There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war criminal.

FISHER: General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear

that a similar policy would be followed in Japan. What about that?

HILDRING: I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are *not* rebuilding the big trusts in Germany, we *have not* rebuilt them, and we *are not going to* rebuild them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only will we not *revive* these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans or the Japanese to do so.

FISHER: And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?

HILDRING: The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.

VINCENT: This, of course, implies a major re-orientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT: Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

FISHER: What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

VINCENT: They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

FISHER: They'll have to have *some* foreign trade of course to keep going.

**VINCENT:** Of course, but not the unhealthy sort they had before the war. A large portion of Japan's pre-war foreign trade assets were used for military preparations, and not to support her internal economy; after all, scrap-iron and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign trade far below the pre-war level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war.

**FISHER:** There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our policy be on food?

**HILLDRING:** General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.

**FISHER:** They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

**DENNISON:** We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy—that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming—and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

**FISHER:** Then, Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transport planes to resume operations.

**DENNISON:** That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, *no civil aviation* will be permitted in Japan.

**VINCENT:** Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

**FISHER:** In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

**VINCENT:** Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—and will, we expect.

**FISHER:** And the labor unions? What about them?

**VINCENT:** We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

**FISHER:** I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

**VINCENT:** General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

**FISHER:** That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

**DENNISON:** Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

**VINCENT:** All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.

**FISHER:** I take all this to mean that the democratic and anti-militarist groups will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

**VINCENT:** It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan". It also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored".

**FISHER:** And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain *their* objectives?

**VINCENT:** In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that

to achieve liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON: We are *not* interested in upholding the *status quo* in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

FISHER: One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party—a Socialist party. What stand will we take on that, General Hilldring?

HILLDRING: If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military fanatics.

FISHER: You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILLDRING: We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result—so long as our troops and our over-all objectives are not endangered.

FISHER: I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion of nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"?

VINCENT: Shintoism, in so far as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, as a state-directed religion is to be done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools.

FISHER: That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT: Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed.

FISHER: And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT: Yes, but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic leanings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON: That's where the real change must

stem from—the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER: And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON: How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels—school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER: What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON: Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER: What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON: Simply that they *like* the American way of life better. At seven, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like, but as they get older they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a taste of them—of real civil liberties—they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING: I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack—they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT: Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if there's to be a real, working democracy in Japan.

HILLDRING: I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT: The press has told you a lot, Mr.

Fisher. I can say here that recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East", or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

**FISHER:** Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hildring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy—one that's aimed at giving *no* encouragement to the imperialists and *every possible* encouragement to the pro-democratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

**ANNOUNCER:** That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hildring,

Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy," presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send \$1 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program. . . . Kennedy Ludlam speaking from Washington, D.C.

## Statement on the Establishment of a Far Eastern Commission To Formulate Policies for the Carrying Out of the Japanese Surrender Terms<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press October 1]

Mr. James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State of the United States, announced that he has received from Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, the consent of the British Government to the proposal made by the United States Government on August 22 for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to formulate policies for the carrying out of the Japanese surrender terms.

The Commission will also be asked to consider whether a Control Council should be established and if so the powers which should be vested in it.

The Soviet Union and China had already given their consent to the establishment of the Commission. France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands will be invited to become members of the Commission.

The first meeting of the Commission will be convened in Washington in the near future.

In agreeing to the establishment of the Commission Mr. Bevin stated it was his understanding that the Commission could determine whether it should meet in Washington or Tokyo. Secretary Byrnes confirmed Mr. Bevin's understanding and said that the United States representative would be instructed to vote that the Commission hold meetings in Tokyo.

Mr. Bevin also requested that India be invited to become a member of the Commission. Mr. Byrnes said the United States would agree to the request and that he would submit the request to the Governments of the Soviet Union and China for their approval.

<sup>1</sup> Issued by the Secretary of State in London on Sept. 29, 1945.

## Report on UNRRA Shipments to Liberated Areas

[Released to the press by UNRRA October 7]

In a report submitted to the Committee on Supplies of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Herbert H. Lehman, Director General, stated that UNRRA shipments to the liberated areas had passed the 2,000,000-ton mark.

"The figures as of the end of September are 2,079,000 long tons of relief supplies shipped", said Mr. Lehman. "Their value was \$530,000,000."

While expressing gratification that shipments are proceeding at an accelerated rate, the Director General stated that lack of funds was now the chief threat to the success of UNRRA's program.

"The end of hostilities", he reported, "has resulted in a great improvement in the supply situation. Shipping, which in the past was one of the most serious bottlenecks in bringing relief to the liberated areas, has eased up to such an extent that we do not anticipate any serious problems in obtaining adequate cargo space. Our main problem is adequate financial resources to take advantage of the improved supply and shipping conditions.

"The greatly increased activities during the last few months have brought us to a point where immediate appropriation of the funds already authorized by the Congress of the United States has become a matter of great urgency. The United States has to date appropriated \$800,000,000 for the work of UNRRA. Of this amount \$80,000,000 has been used and \$13,000,000 is in the process of being used for the procurement of scarce supplies not available in the United States. An additional \$47,000,000 has been used for transport services, for other relief and rehabilitation services, and for administrative expenses. The remaining \$660,000,000 has been or is being used for the procurement of relief and rehabilitation supplies from the United States. Of this last amount, \$270,000,000 worth of supplies had been shipped by the end of September. Shipments programmed for October and November from the United States represent another \$270,000,000. All of this last amount is already under procure-

ment. The remaining \$120,000,000 is largely under procurement to maintain a sufficient pipeline of supplies, many of which have production cycles ranging from 4 to 10 months.

"Every day of delay in making additional funds available to us increases the danger of creating a break in our flow of supplies to the liberated areas during the most critical period of the winter months. We are already handicapped in our forward procurements. However, this committee will be glad to know that the United States congressional hearings on the appropriation of the remainder of the funds already authorized will, I am advised, commence shortly."

Discussing UNRRA's policy of making full use of Army surpluses which can be fitted into its relief program, the Director General said:

"With the end of hostilities UNRRA took immediate steps to obtain as much as possible of the needed supplies from the armies, whose stocks suddenly became surplus to a considerable extent. The total volume of supplies procured from surpluses owned by the United States Government amounted to more than \$59,000,000 by the end of August. This figure includes \$21,600,000 worth of clothing which had been procured from United States Army cutbacks after the end of hostilities in Europe and immediately programmed for shipment so as to permit distribution in the liberated countries before winter. Most of this surplus property came from the continental United States.

"A joint U.S. Government - UNRRA mission went to Europe at the beginning of September to procure \$150,000,000 worth of supplies from United States Army surpluses overseas. UNRRA had prepared a list of requirements with an estimated value of nearly \$200,000,000. These lists were distributed by the military authorities to Army depots in Europe. They were screened against actual availabilities, and 75 percent of these requirements have been indicated as available and \$150,000,000 have been set aside and ten-

tatively allocated by major commodity groups as follows:

Industrial Rehabilitation (including trucks) . . .	\$ 83,000,000
Agricultural Rehabilitation . . . . .	27,000,000
Clothing, Textiles and Footwear . . . . .	10,000,000
Medical Supplies and Equipment . . . . .	8,000,000
Food . . . . .	22,000,000
	<hr/>
	\$150,000,000

"The Administration hopes to obtain from the United States Army upward of 40,000 trucks. It has received reports that the delivery of the Army surplus trucks has already started from Italy to Greece and Yugoslavia and is to begin from northwestern Europe to Poland and Czechoslovakia in the first part of October. Individual commodities included on the list of UNRRA requirements from Army surpluses includes also canned meats, evaporated milk, lard, oleomargarine, Army rations, and soaps, as well as blankets, comforters, and footwear, and large stores of medical supplies.

"Under arrangements with the Canadian Government the Canadian military authorities are delivering, out of Canadian Army surpluses, trucks to Poland and Czechoslovakia at the rate of 200 trucks per day; the total number of Canadian surplus trucks which will be made available to UNRRA is expected to exceed 5,000. Other Canadian surplus property, including clothing, is also under procurement. Supplies from British military surpluses have also begun to flow to UNRRA, consisting thus far mainly of trucks, mules, and medical supplies. Much of our procurement of clothing, food, and medical supplies in Australia and New Zealand also has war surpluses as its source.

"In order to accelerate the delivery of programmed supplies to China when additional funds become available, UNRRA is also undertaking surveys of available U.S. military surpluses in the Far East and is conducting negotiations with military authorities looking forward to their purchase."

Mr. Lehman reported that some of the countries which until recently had been occupied by the enemy and which are being helped by UNRRA

are now contributing supplies to other liberated areas.

"At the Third Session of the Council in London a representative of the Czechoslovak Government informed the Council that his Government was preparing a list of supplies which Czechoslovakia will have in surplus and will be able to hand over to UNRRA. One of the items will be sugar. The Italian Government has agreed to make immediately available 10,000 tons of salt as a contribution to UNRRA and destined for Yugoslavia. UNRRA is carrying on negotiations with the Government of Norway which may result in a contribution of some surpluses which Norway may be able to spare for the work of UNRRA. We hope that these contributions represent only the beginning of what the liberated countries may be able to do to assist UNRRA."

Commenting on the distribution of the shipment of the 2,079,000 tons of supplies through September (see tables I, II, III, and IV),<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lehman said:

"You will note that, although we have succeeded in improving the situation very considerably in some receiving countries, other countries continue to constitute a problem. Thus, while shipments from Yugoslavia in September reached 134,000 tons compared with 64,000 tons in July, shipments to Czechoslovakia and Poland amounted to little over 40,000 tons each, due primarily to lack of sufficient port reception capacity."

The following table shows UNRRA shipments to the liberated areas through September.

**ESTIMATED SHIPMENT OF UNRRA SUPPLIES TO LIBERATED AREAS BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1945**

(Basis of Vessels Cleared)

Country of Destination	Gross Long Tons	Dollar Value
Albania . . . . .	25,400	\$9,000,000
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	158,400	73,900,000
Greece . . . . .	1,168,900	189,800,000
Italy . . . . .	102,200	21,000,000
Poland . . . . .	163,300	89,900,000
Yugoslavia . . . . .	455,400	143,600,000
Other UNRRA Operations . . . . .	5,200	2,700,000
China . . . . .	200	600,000
<b>TOTAL . . . . .</b>	<b>2,079,000</b>	<b>\$530,500,000</b>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

# Discussions on Draft Constitution for Educational and Cultural Organization

## GROUP MEETING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Released to the press October 1]

The draft constitution of the proposed Educational and Cultural Organization of the United Nations was discussed at a conference held at the Department of State on September 24.<sup>1</sup> The meeting was one of a series being held throughout the country for the purpose of informing representatives of interested organizations about the proposals and for obtaining suggestions for changes in the draft constitution. Similar meetings have been held in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Denver.

Suggestions and recommendations emanating from these meetings will be transmitted to the United States Delegation to the United Nations conference which is to be held in London beginning November 1 for final drafting of the constitution.

Representatives of some 50 national organizations accepted the invitation to attend the meeting in Washington, where discussion centered around such questions as:

Should membership in the organization be limited to members of the United Nations?

Is the statement of functions and purposes adequate as contained in the draft constitution?

Are its provisions adequate to establish mutually satisfactory relations between the organization and private international organizations?

How should the relations between this organization and the United Nations be defined in the agreement to be concluded after the organization is established?

## REMARKS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENTON<sup>2</sup>

[Released to the press October 1]

I have been trying to get rid of that term *educational and cultural affairs*, but you can see how it haunts me. It is impossible to get terminology that properly describes some of these areas in which I am interested. The announcement of Acting Secretary Acheson dubbed me with a new phrase as Assistant Secretary in charge of public affairs. That seems to take in almost anything.

It gives me a lot of satisfaction to welcome you to this working conference of citizens and the State Department. Today's meeting is significant and it seems to me a practical attempt to further the democratic processes in foreign affairs and in the making of foreign policy through meetings of the State Department with those most competent to advise it.

<sup>1</sup> For text of draft constitution see BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1945, p. 168.

<sup>2</sup> Made at the opening of the Washington meeting, at which Mr. Benton presided.

I inquired last week about the history of this idea of consultants for the State Department, and I find that it began in a very small way as far back as 1934 with the creation of a committee called the Committee for Reciprocity Information. Through this committee the public attempted to advise the State Department on questions on the Trade Agreements Act. We—all of us—know more about the continuation of this idea last winter in the form of the national program of discussion and consultation centering around the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and of course that program culminated very logically in the consultant operation at the San Francisco conference.

It is my hope in my area of public affairs greatly to expand on these rather humble beginnings in the coming months. Good ideas are seldom if ever, however, new ideas; someone's always had them before.

The test of any good idea is the way in which it

is applied. I remember at the University of Chicago an area that interested me greatly, and that was the University broadcasting. When I joined the staff of the University nine years ago I found going along on the air every week the University of Chicago Round Table. That program had been created by some of the professors who were interested in broadcasting and a dozen or fifteen of them who were most interested took turns giving up their time on Sundays to put the program on the air; in fact, there was one stretch of sixteen weeks where the same three men went on every week because no one else would go on. I discovered that a large percentage of the board of trustees of the University of Chicago had never even heard of the program. A considerable percentage of the people on the faculty refused to participate in it. I didn't create the program; as a matter of fact, in spite of all my efforts during the nine years, I didn't affect it very greatly, but I did at least get the money and the production talent and the people to work on it so that, during my responsibility for it, it became known not only to the board of trustees of the University of Chicago but became established as the leading, most important program of its kind in broadcasting and, for a long period of years, enjoyed the largest audience of any program of its kind in broadcasting. I give this only as an illustration that the idea was not new but the problem was a problem of the development of a good idea.

The subject you are going to discuss today is to me of course not only important but very exciting; in fact, it is the most exciting subject to me personally in which I have been projected these past few weeks.

I joined the staff of the University of Chicago because of my deep interest in education. My father for 33 years was a university professor; my mother spent 25 years of her life as a teacher and university professor; my uncle was head of the Latin and Greek department of the University of Minnesota for almost 40 years; my aunt was in the Latin department at Smith for over 20 years and later dean of women at Carlton College in Minnesota. My interest in education thus springs out of my childhood—out of my family background—and it has been enhanced by these past 9 years in Chicago. I know we can all agree it is not possible to overestimate the part education

can play in making or breaking the new United Nations Organization.

For the past six years we have been putting all our strength and all our intelligence into the fight against Fascism, and now we must try to turn the same strength and that same intelligence into a fight for peace and for a better life for the common man. We are now setting up the Organization of the United Nations through which we hope to determine the outcome of that fight. The strategy of terror won the battles for Japan and Germany; the strategy of truth could help us win these coming battles of the peace. Our chances of winning are very slim indeed unless the people of the United Nations can arm themselves with the truth.

Looking back it seems very odd that the word *education* was not mentioned even once in the League of Nations Covenant. Even in San Francisco I understand that there was a pretty hot argument over whether that dangerous word should be in the Charter. We can thank the forces of progress at San Francisco for the fact that it is not only mentioned but that it is mentioned nine times.

The fact that education has been perverted into propaganda by enemies of democracy isn't any reason for us to be timid. Educators will always be accused of being propagandists. Of course I am already so accused, in this new job of mine, but it isn't any excuse for failure to try to do the job.

The new Educational and Cultural Organization of the United Nations cannot be allowed to fail. There isn't any such thing in the mind of man as a vacuum. Where truth does not penetrate, ignorance and prejudice are sure to prevail. I hope that you will go away from this discussion feeling that the chances for truth are being advanced. Good luck to all of you today and God-speed.

### THE FOREIGN SERVICE

#### Embassy at Warsaw

The American Embassy at Warsaw, Poland, was reestablished July 31, 1945.

# Agreement Between United States and Norway Relating to Air-Transport Services

[Released to the press October 6]

The Department of State announced the conclusion of a reciprocal civil air-transport agreement with Norway, which was concluded by exchange of notes dated October 6, 1945 signed by Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton and the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Mr. Lars J. Jorstad.

The agreement, which becomes effective October 15, includes the so-called "fifth freedom" privileges with respect to the carriage of international traffic.

Text of the agreement follows:

## AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND NORWAY RELATING TO AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

The Governments of the United States of America and Norway signed on October 16, 1933 an air navigation arrangement governing the operation of civil aircraft of the one country in the territory of the other country, in which each party agreed that consent for the operations over its territory by air transport companies of the other party might not be refused on unreasonable or arbitrary grounds. Pursuant to the aforementioned arrangement of 1933, the two governments hereby conclude the following arrangement covering the operation of scheduled airline services between their respective territories, based on the standard form of agreement for air routes and services included in the Final Act of the International Civil Aviation Conference signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944.

### Article 1

The contracting parties grant the rights specified in the Annex hereto necessary for establishing the international civil air routes and services therein described, whether such services be inaugurated immediately or at a later date at the option of the contracting party to whom the rights are granted.

### Article 2

(a) Each of the air services so described shall be placed in operation as soon as the contracting party to whom the rights have been granted by Article 1 to designate an airline or airlines for the route concerned has authorized an airline for such route, and the contracting party granting the rights shall, subject to Article 6 hereof, be bound to give the appropriate operating permission to the airline or airlines concerned; provided that the airlines so designated may be required to qualify before the competent aeronautical authorities of the contracting party granting the rights under the laws and regulations normally applied by these authorities before being permitted to engage in the operations contemplated by this agreement; and provided that in areas of hostilities or of military occupation, or in areas affected thereby, such inauguration shall be subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.

(b) It is understood that either contracting party granted commercial rights under this agreement should exercise them at the earliest practicable date except in the case of temporary inability to do so.

### Article 3

In order to prevent discriminatory practices and to assure equality of treatment, both contracting parties agree that:

(a) Each of the contracting parties may impose or permit to be imposed just and reasonable charges for the use of public airports and other facilities under its control. Each of the contracting parties agrees, however, that these charges shall not be higher than would be paid for the use of such airports and facilities by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services.

(b) Fuel, lubricating oils and spare parts introduced into the territory of one contracting party by the other contracting party or its nationals, and

intended solely for use by aircraft of such other contracting party shall be accorded national and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to the imposition of customs duties, inspection fees or other national duties or charges by the contracting party whose territory is entered.

(c) The fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores retained on board civil aircraft of the airlines of one contracting party authorized to operate the routes and services described in the Annex shall, upon arriving in or leaving the territory of the other contracting party, be exempt from customs, inspection fees or similar duties or charges, even though such supplies be used or consumed by such aircraft on flights in that territory.

#### *Article 4*

Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by one contracting party shall be recognized as valid by the other contracting party for the purpose of operating the routes and services described in the Annex. Each contracting party reserves the right, however, to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to its own nationals by another state.

#### *Article 5*

(a) The laws and regulations of one contracting party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of the other contracting party, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of the first party.

(b) The laws and regulations of one contracting party as to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew, or cargo of aircraft, such as regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo of the other contracting party upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of the first party.

#### *Article 6*

Each contracting party reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an airline of the other party in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of either party to this agreement, or in case of failure of an airline to comply with the laws of the state over which it operates as described in Article 5 hereof, or to perform its obligations under this agreement.

#### *Article 7*

This agreement and all contracts connected therewith shall be registered with the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization.

#### *Article 8*

Except as may be modified by the present agreement, the general principles of the aforementioned air navigation arrangement of 1933 as applicable to scheduled air transport services shall continue in force until otherwise agreed upon by the two contracting parties.

#### *Article 9*

In the event either of the contracting parties considers it desirable to modify the routes or conditions set forth in the attached Annex, it may request consultation between the competent authorities of both contracting parties, such consultation to begin within a period of sixty days from the date of the request. When these authorities mutually agree on new or revised conditions affecting the Annex, their recommendations on the matter will come into effect after they have been confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

#### *Article 10*

Either contracting party may terminate this agreement, or the rights for any of the services granted thereunder, by giving one year's notice to the other contracting party.

#### **ANNEX TO AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND NORWAY**

A. Airlines of the United States of America authorized under the present agreement are accorded rights of transit and non-traffic stop in the territory of Norway, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo

and mail at Oslo (Gardermoen) or Stavanger (Sola), on the following route:

The United States via intermediate points to Oslo or Stavanger and points beyond; in both directions.

Airlines of the United States of America having the right to pick up and discharge international traffic on the above route will make sufficient traffic stops in Oslo or Stavanger to offer reasonable commercial service for traffic to and from Norway; provided that this undertaking shall not involve any discrimination between airlines of the United States and other countries operating on that same route, shall take into account the capacity of the aircraft, and shall be fulfilled in such a manner as not to prejudice the normal operations of the international air services concerned.

B. Airlines of Norway authorized under the present agreement are accorded rights of transit and non-traffic stop in the territory of the United States of America, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail at New York or Chicago, on the following route:

Norway via intermediate points to New York or Chicago; in both directions.

## Suggestion for Postponement of Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace and Security

**Statement by ACTING SECRETARY ACHESON**

[Released to the press October 3]

In view of recent developments in Argentina, the United States Government does not feel that it can properly negotiate or sign with the present Argentine regime a treaty of military assistance. Since the conference to be convened in Rio de Janeiro on October 20 is exclusively for the purpose of negotiating such a treaty, this Government has communicated with the host Government of

<sup>1</sup> The Governing Board of the Pan American Union met on Oct. 5 and adopted a resolution presented by Ambassador Galo Plaza, of Ecuador, to postpone the Rio conference scheduled for Oct. 20 and to call a special meeting of the Governing Board for Nov. 20 to consider a new date for the inter-American conference.

Brazil suggesting that that conference be postponed but emphasizing that, in view of the great importance which this Government attaches to the negotiation of such a treaty, it has urged that negotiations proceed as rapidly as possible to the end of concluding and signing such a treaty in Rio de Janeiro at the earliest possible moment.<sup>1</sup>

## Argentine Situation

**Statement by ACTING SECRETARY ACHESON**

[Released to the press October 3]

It is the purpose of this Government to consult with the other American republics in respect to the Argentine situation.

## Arrangements for Housing Americans in Paris

[Released to the press October 6]

Special arrangements for housing Americans who are temporarily in Paris on business have been made by the American Embassy there.

Due to the difficulty experienced by visiting American businessmen in locating rooms and in obtaining meals, the Embassy has arranged, in cooperation with the Army, to operate the Hotel California in the Rue de Berri for the accommodation of a limited number of Americans whose reason for being in Paris is one of importance to the reestablishment of international trade.

The prices have been fixed at \$2.75 per day for meals and from \$4 to \$11 per day for rooms. No reservations can be made in advance, but accommodations will be assigned by the Embassy's visitors bureau to businessmen on arrival in Paris, if they are on important missions connected with international trade and are unable to find accommodations elsewhere.

The Department emphasizes that only transients can be accommodated, and that persons intending to remain in Paris for three weeks or longer must seek other arrangements. The Embassy's visitors bureau will assist them in this, but cannot give advance assurances that suitable accommodations can be found.

The Army has agreed to permit businessmen traveling outside of Paris, in areas where U. S. forces are stationed, to use Army billeting and mess facilities wherever they are available.

The Department repeats its warning to prospective American travelers that the conditions they will face in Paris and elsewhere in Europe are extremely bad, and will be worse during the winter months, and urges that no one attempt to travel there except on matters of urgent importance.

## Compensation for Petroleum Properties Expropriated in Mexico

[Released to the press October 2]

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Mexico has presented to the Acting Secretary of State his Government's check for \$4,085,327.45 in payment of the instalment due at this time under the agreement effected through an exchange of notes on September 29, 1943 establishing the manner and conditions of payment of compensation to this Government for the benefit of certain American nationals who sustained losses as a consequence of the expropriation of petroleum properties in Mexico in March 1938.<sup>1</sup> The Acting Secretary of State requested the Chargé d'Affaires to convey to his Government an expression of this Government's appreciation.

With the present payment of \$4,085,327.45 the balance remaining amounts to \$8,170,654.90 to be liquidated over a period of two years by the payment of \$4,085,327.45 on September 30 of each year. Upon payment of the remaining instalments the total payments will amount to \$29,137,700.84.

### THE DEPARTMENT

#### Division of International Conferences<sup>2</sup>

*Purpose.* The present order is issued to redefine, pending the issuance of a more comprehensive order, the responsibilities within the Department of State for the conduct of or participation in international conferences, congresses, expositions, meetings, et cetera.

*1 Responsibilities for over-all supervision.* The Assistant Secretary or other officer designated by the Secretary, charged with jurisdiction over the subject-matter with which an international con-

ference is to deal, shall be responsible for the execution of policy and for the over-all supervision of the preparations for and conduct of the conferences. The Division of International Conferences and the political or technical divisions primarily concerned shall collaborate with, advise, and assist the Assistant Secretary as required.

*2 Primary responsibility for organizational and administrative aspects.* The Division of International Conferences shall, under the direction of the appropriate Assistant Secretary and in collaboration with the pertinent political or technical divisions, have primary responsibility for the planning, coordination, and execution of organizational and administrative aspects of international conferences in which the Government of the United States and, particularly, the Department of State participate, other than conferences of the United Nations Organization. With respect to the latter category the Division of International Conferences and the Office of Special Political Affairs shall collaborate as circumstances may require. The services of the Division of International Conferences shall also be available, upon his request, to the Assistant Secretary in charge, for coordination and planning with respect to policy aspects of any conferences in which the Government of the United States participates.

*3 Collaboration of other offices and divisions.* The offices and divisions of the Department which are responsible for budget, personnel, and administrative servicing matters shall collaborate with and work under the general direction of the Division of International Conferences in regard to the planning and execution of the administrative aspects of international conferences at home and United States participation in conferences held abroad.

*4 Information for the Division of International Conferences.* The Division of International Conferences shall be informed promptly and fully of any circumstances that may lead to the convening of an international conference and shall be kept informed of current developments regarding such conference. In this connection the Records Branch of the Division of Central Services shall

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1944, p. 385.

<sup>2</sup> Departmental Order 1340, issued and effective Sept. 22, 1945.

see that the Division of International Conferences is included in the routing or distribution of papers relating to all international conferences.

*5 Applicability of the foregoing provisions to international congresses, expositions, et cetera.* The foregoing provisions shall also apply with respect to international congresses, expositions, meetings, et cetera.

*6 Departmental orders amended.* Departmental Order 1301, and any other order in conflict herewith, are amended accordingly.

DEAN ACHESON  
Acting Secretary

### Appointment of Officers

Francis H. Russell as Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, such designation to run concurrently with his duties as Chief of the Division of Public Liaison, effective September 29, 1945.

### THE CONGRESS

**Study of Naturalization Laws and Procedures:** Hearings before Subcommittee II of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to H.R. 52, a bill authorizing a complete study of immigration and naturalization laws and problems. May 9, June 4 and 6, 1945. iii, 95 pp.

**To Provide for Reorganizing Agencies of the Government, and for Other Purposes:** Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, on H.R. 3325, a bill to provide for reorganizing agencies of the Government, and for other purposes, September 4 and 5, 1945. ii, 137 pp.

**Elimination of German Resources for War:** Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S.Res. 107 (78th Congress) and S.Res. 146 (79th Congress), authorizing a study of war mobilization problems; part 5, Testimony of Treasury Department, July 2, 1945. iv, 283 pp.

**Amending Section 401(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940 so as To Preserve the Nationality of Certain United States Citizens Who Have Been Unable To Return to the United States.** H.Rept. 1035, 79th Cong., to accompany H.R. 4191. 3 pp. [Favorable report.]

**Creating a Joint Committee To Study and Investigate the Control of the Atomic Bomb.** H.Rept. 1036, 79th Cong., to accompany H.Con.Res. 83. 1 p.

Supplemental Estimates of Appropriations for the Department of State. H.Doc. 299, 79th Cong. 2 pp.

Facilitating Further the Disposition of Prizes Captured by the United States. S.Rept. 603, 79th Cong., to accompany S. 1420. 4 pp. [Favorable report.]

## Publications

### of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., who is the authorized distributor of Government publications. To avoid delay, address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

\**Status of Countries in Relation to the War,* August 12, 1945. Compiled by Katharine Elizabeth Crane. Publication 2389. 13 pp. 10¢.

Supplementing a previous study by Dr. Crane, entitled *Status of Countries in Relation to the War*, April 22, 1944.

\**Air Transport Services:* Agreement Between the United States of America and Ireland—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Washington February 3, 1945. Executive Agreement Series 460. Publication 2375. 9 pp. 5¢.

An agreement between the two Governments to allow for air privileges in the territories under their jurisdiction, according to the standard form provided in the final act of the International Civil Aviation Conference signed at Chicago December 7, 1944.

\**Diplomatic List,* September 1945. Publication 2385. ii, 128 pp. Subscription, \$2 a year; single copy 20¢.

Monthly list of foreign diplomatic representatives in Washington, with their addresses, prepared by the Division of Protocol of the Department of State.

*A cumulative list of the publications of the Department of State, from October 1, 1929 to July 1, 1945 (publication 2373) may be had from the Department of State.*